When Repression Is Democratic and
Constitutional: The Federalist Theory of
Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798
James P. Martint
This Article examines the Federalist rhetoric surrounding the brief appearance of
Democratic-RepublicanClubs (1794-95) and the Sedition Act of 1798. Though now universally believed anti-democratic,Federalistpositions are actually a reflection of the now forgotten but in importantways superiordemocratic theory they held. Representation by definition requires repression since elected officials perform a political process for the people
that the people are no longer permitted to perform themselves. Repression, therefore, may
serve democratic ends. This simple insightpermits a fresh look at Federalistrhetoric of the
1790s and the democraticprocesses/institutionsthey championed.Federalistsclaimed the
people "deliberated"only via their representativesin the legislatureand therefore that only
the legislature could authoritativelydeclare what public opinion was or fully participatein
the political deliberationsof the polity. The "representative"quality ofpoliticaldebatejustified Federalistrepression.The modern system of politicaldeliberation, in which the people
"discuss"politics via the mass media and political organizations,the Federalistsargued,
only empowers nonrepresentativeminorities. Instead, if popularparticipationis restricted
to the right of petition and election, methods that inform and motivate representatives
without intruding directly into political deliberations, the whole people can participate
equally in debate via their representatives.ProperlycomprehendingFederalistideas radically reorients our understandingof the FirstAmendment and opens up many avenues of
democratic reform.
INTRODUCTION

Scholarly interpretation of the role of the Sedition Act in
American constitutional development is at an impasse. The Federalists, who founded this nation and led it until 1800, passed
this act in 1798. There is a conflict between what the evidence indicates the Federalists believed and what modern understandings of democratic theory suggest they should have believed. The
Sedition Act is an example of a seditious libel statute, and there
are many indications that the Federalists accepted this kind of
law. Modern commentators, however, have been unable to see
how the Sedition Act, with its restrictions on freedom of speech
and political association, or seditious libel laws generally, can be
reconciled with the principles of representative government. The
quandary, then, is, given the Act's anti-democratic-and therefore, most assume, unconstitutional-nature, how could the Fed-
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eralists, who bequeathed the nation a representative form of government, knowingly have passed it?
This Article suggests that the answer to this quandary can
be found when it is realized that the Federalists possessed and
defended a system and theory of democracy significantly different
from that which operates and is believed in today. During the
1790s, not only in connection with the Sedition Act, but throughout the decade, especially during the controversy over the Democratic-Republican Clubs, the Federalists defended their system
and articulated the coherent, plausible-but to modern eyes,
quite unfamiliar-democratic theory that justified its operation.
What is important about this is that, strange as it seems, the Sedition Act is perfectly democratic in the context of this theory and
system. In fact, laws such as the Sedition Act played an essential
and supportive role in the Federalists' democratic system. Even
more surprising, Federalist ideas are arguably more democratic
than modern ones, especially if one takes into account the undeveloped conditions that still prevailed in the 1790s.
The core difference between the Federalist and modern theories of representation is that the Federalists believed that the
public interactions and debates that are a part of any democracy
should take place via the representative mechanisms that operate through the legal institutions of the state. In other words,
elected officials deliberated for the people and in their place, just
as they still pass legislation on behalf of the people and in their
name.' This view is the key to understanding the Federalists' peculiar belief that the Sedition Act was justified democratically
and why it is still relevant today. When a political process operates through the formal institutions of the state, the context and
character of its operation can be influenced by deliberate political
choice and calculated to best effect. Its quality and democratic
character can therefore be improved, and, in fact, it may be that a
democratic process may not occur at all if it is not organized in
this way.2 A price must be paid for these advantages, however.
' The observation that representatives deliberated for the people is not in itself new.
It has been made by historians and political scientists. James Fishkin, for example, says
that the Federalists envisioned a system "where the representatives would have the discussions and deliberations and come to decisions on behalf of the rest of us." James S. Fishkin,
The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy 5 (Yale 1995). For similar comments,
see Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American
National Government 1 (Chicago 1994) ("The citizenry would reason, or deliberate, through
their representatives."). These and other analysts, however, have not realized the implications of this observation, that deliberating through representatives completely changes the
normative and institutional structure of the system.
2 It is not clear whether laws could be passed without representative structures, and
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Making a process representative fundamentally changes how it
operates and entails practices and attitudes that will appear repressive and undemocratic when judged by the standards of direct democracy. Representation is a structured and indirect process. The people no longer participate directly themselves; their
representatives participate for them, and public input is channeled and expressed through the mediation of these agents.
Structure, however, implies repression. What commentators have
failed to realize, then, is that the repressive aspects of the Sedition Act served democratic purposes by keeping public deliberation a representative, not a direct, process.
The Federalist theory of democracy has played little part in
the academic controversies over the Sedition Act because it has
been misunderstood and underestimated. Instead, accepting the
contention that democracy depends on open public discussion,
commentators have consistently misunderstood the relationship
between Federalism and democracy. Interpretations for most of
this century have alternated between those who, citing such instances as the Sedition Act, have condemned the Federalists as
aristocratic anti-democratic reactionaries and those who, attempting to minimize the significance of these instances, have
found other reasons to view the Federalists as liberal democrats.'
Even the more recent "republican" interpreters, who question aspects of liberal democracy, misinterpret the Federalists on this
score. These theorists view Federalism as a fountainhead of preliberal "republican" ideas that can be eclectically appropriated to
justify increased regulation and state involvement in the process

which representative structures are more democratic-proportional representation or single member districts, for example-are questions that require conscious political choice.
Deliberating through the private sector, in contrast, means that great transformations,
such as the shift to television politics, occur due to changes in technology and commerce,
and do not reflect explicit political choice or calculation.
' Leonard Levy is the author most strongly associated with the view of the Federalists
as anti-democrats. For the classic statement, see Leonard W. Levy, Legacy ofSuppression:
Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History (Harvard 1964) (discussing Federalist-era attempts to suppress dissent). The latest example is Richard N. Rosenfeld,
American Aurora (St. Martin's 1997) (portraying Federalists as opponents of democracy).
See also David Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L Rev 455 (1983) (distinguishing between Federalists responsible for the Sedition Act and the original Framers).
Additionally, the contradictory implications of the eighteenth century belief in both seditious
libel and representative democracy have led some commentators to conclude that it is impossible to make proper sense of this period. Philip Kurland, for example, calls the intellectual
origins of the First Amendment "a disorganized glop." Philip B. Kurland, The Original Understandingof the Freedom of the Press Provision of the FirstAmendment, 55 Miss L J 225,
257 (1985). See also Thomas I. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the
FirstAmendment, 125 U Pa L Rev 737 (1977) (concluding that due to a multitude of contradictions, it is "by no means clear" what the First Amendment means).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[66:117

of public discussion in ways that ameliorate some of the defects of
modern democracy.4 The problem these reformers have in mind
has been extensively analyzed by many democratic theorists.
These theorists have long bemoaned the distortions, superficiality, and inequities present in public discussion carried on as it is
now through the network of private associations, parties, and
mass media that compose what is now usually called "civil society."5 Despite their desire to reform liberal democracy, by ignoring Federalist thought on this subject republican theorists have
misunderstood the real implications of this body of thought.
Understanding the democratic system and theory lying behind the Sedition Act, however, radically changes our perspective.
While the Federalists were unquestionably "liberal" in many respects, their understanding of the representative process clearly
was not. While it is true they were aristocratic reactionaries,
their democratic credentials were impeccable. What is more, their
notion of state co-option of public discussion provides the foundation for a far more radical reform of the democratic process than
any "republican" theorist has hitherto imagined and proves
democratic theorists mistaken in their insistence that "civil society" is necessary for democratic functioning.
While revolutionary, however, Federalist ideas are far more
difficult to appropriate than republican theorists have thought.'
' In the now vast literature on republicanism, the work of Cass Sunstein and Frank
Michelman is prominent. See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem
of Free Speech (Free 1993) (drawing on the Federalist view that the First Amendment
primarily serves to protect democratic self-government to reconcile various regulations
with the Constitution); Cass R. Sunstein, Republicanism, Rights: A Comment on Pangle,
66 Chi-Kent L Rev 177, 177-80 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 Yale L J 1539 (1988) (arguing that certain speech-restrictive proposals are consistent
with the republican ideal of deliberative democracy). For more articles on republicanism,
see also Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L J (1988); Linda R.
Hirschman, ed, Symposium: Symposium on Classical Philosophy and the American ConstitutionalOrder, 66 Chi-Kent L Rev (1990). It should be mentioned that the literature on
republicanism is integrally related to the literature on "deliberative democracy" and the
"public sphere," the latter inspired by Jfirgen Habermas's work. See, for example, Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Harvard 1996) (discussing deliberation). All three literatures are fundamentally concerned with founding democracy on discussion rather than the mechanical counting of votes, and there has been much
cross-fertilization between the fields.
' Though the term "civil society" is used differently by different authors and cannot be
reduced simply to political and media organizations, these groups nonetheless form major
ingredients in virtually all definitions of its modern manifestation. See, for example, Jean
L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and PoliticalTheory ix (MIT 1992) (writing that
"civil society" includes "the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication").
' The criticism that the appealing features of republicanism cannot be separated from
its many illiberal presuppositions has been made before, but on different premises. For
one of many examples, see Martin H. Redish and Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression
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These ideas made sense in the context of undeveloped conditions
lacking mass communications and a world view still imbued with
hierarchical notions of a "natural order." In fact, it is their inappropriateness to the modern world that explains the early death
of this system and theory. In truth, these ideas were already seriously eroding at the time the Sedition Act was passed and were
thoroughly disowned in the early nineteenth century. In this context the Sedition Act was really a "last hurrah" and pyrrhic victory in a conflict between a fading "republican" and still emerging
"liberal" understanding of representation and the political and
social order. While the Federalists' desperate attempt to shore up
their view of the constitutional order was a failure, it continues to
possess relevance. Their system and theory remain part of our
constitutional inheritance. Their relevance to our problems and
their superiority in many aspects stand as a challenge to our
more open understanding of democracy. Though the Federalist
system as a whole as they understood it will never be resuscitated, it may provide elements that can be utilized to address
some of our problems today. The first step in this project is to
properly understand Federalist thought, and this Article will do
this in a manner that is intended to clarify and frame its current
relevance.
To demonstrate these points the following steps are necessary. First, a brief examination of the historical evidence informs
readers of the nature of the problem addressed. Next, a theoretical section outlines the advantages of using representation and
explains what the concept means and how it applies to the process of deliberation. Finally, the bulk of the Article examines the
Federalist polemics of the 1790s. This last section is divided into
parts dealing with the major claims of the Federalists. The first
explores their central and startling assertion that public deliberation and speaking for the people can be, like passing laws, an activity reserved for elected officials. The second part examines the
Federalist claim that the people are obligated to support the poliand the Civic Republican Revival in ConstitutionalTheory: The Ominous Implications, 79
Cal L Rev 267, 268 (1991) ("Once the morally deplorable elements from its past are excised, the classical concept of civic republicanism may no longer be conceptually viable.");
Steven G. Gey, The UnfortunateRevival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U Pa L Rev 801, 803
(1993) (demonstrating that classical civic republicanism conflicts with both ends of the
current political spectrum); Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American ConstitutionalThought, 29 Wm & Mary L Rev 57, 67 (1987) (suggesting that republicans "will not easily fit [today's] liberal or republican models"); Thomas L. Pangle, The
Classical Challenge to the American Constitution, 66 Chi-Kent L Rev 145 (1990). These
criticisms have also been made in the social sciences. See, for example, Don Herzog, Some
Questionsfor Republicans, 14 Political Theory 473, 473-95 (1986).
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cies and pronouncements of their officials, as they are obligated
to obey laws. Third, the sound reasons why the Federalists
thought their system more democratic than the modern alternative are shown. These three parts together form the core of the
Federalist challenge to current First Amendment thinking. A
fourth part explores the legal and political processes that constituted the Federalist system of representation and enabled their
representatives to deliberate democratically for the people. The
general parameters of Federalist First Amendment thought that
are implied by those processes are examined in the fifth part. The
last part examines the enormous ambiguities and barriers that
inhibit the current utilization of Federalist theory but concludes
with the hope that useful elements can be salvaged.
I.

HISTORICAL SETTING

Since the Sedition Act was part of a larger battle over the
principles of representative government that occurred in the
1790s, it cannot be considered in isolation. The controversy with
the Democratic-Republican Clubs is especially significant since
the Sedition Act is really the culmination of the former episode,
the principles involved being identical. Trying to make sense out
of both the Sedition Act and the debate of the clubs presents a
historical riddle that is easily summarized.
The Sedition Act had two parts. The first part, whose significance has been virtually ignored by commentators, proscribed organized opposition to public measures.7 The second made it illegal
to criticize government, provided the criticism was malicious, untrue, alienated the people's affections from their government, or
brought the government into the contempt of the people. The sec-

' See An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, 5th Cong,
1st Sess, in III Annals of Cong 3776-77 (July 14, 1798) (Gales and Seaton 1851). All but a

few specialists on this subject have overlooked the fact that freedom of association issues
were also involved. See Charles E. Rice, Freedom of Association 124 (NYU 1962) (making

this point).
Freedom of association as an issue was also largely ignored at the time. Congressman
Robert Goodloe Harper commented on this matter in a letter circulated to his constituents,
dated February 10, 1799. He stated that the "first section," banning organized opposition to
government, "has never been complained of, nor has any objection been made to its constitutionality. The objections are confined to the second section." Robert Goodloe Harper, Letter to
His Constituents (Feb 10, 1799), in Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., ed, 1 CircularLetters of Congressmen to Their Constituents, 1789-1829 146, 147 (UNC 1978). See also Rice, Freedom of
Association at 124. The Congressional Record also reveals no complaints specifically against
the first section despite the many complaints about the other section. See Report of Committee On Alien and Sedition Laws, III Annals of Cong 2987 (Feb 25, 1799). This was pointed
out by Thomas F. Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the FederalistPeriod: The
SeditionAct, 18 Mich L Rev 615, 617 (1920).
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ond provision appears to be a clear violation of freedom of speech
and the first of freedom of political association.
From the perspective of commentators today, few things
seem as obvious as the fact that the Sedition Act violated certain
fundamental principles of representative democracy embodied in
the United States Constitution. This is the virtually unanimous
opinion of all political scientists, historians, and legal scholars
who have examined the Act, and this view has been expressly
embodied in a number of court cases.8 This view, in fact, has been
almost universal since the middle of the nineteenth century when
the Act was explicitly disowned by Congress and was condemned
even by such fairly conservative figures as Henry Adams and

John C. Calhoun.'

8 The literature discussing the essential role that freedom of speech and association
play in democratic systems is, of course, copious. As one modern commentator has said,
"Governments are called 'democracies' when they permit freedom of speech and press.
States that put down critics are taken to be undemocratic." Frederick Schauer, Free Speech
and the Argument from Democracy, in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds, Liberal Democracy: Nomos XXV 241 (NYU 1983). Another argued that "[t]he concept of seditious libel strikes at the heart of democracy .... [D]efamation of the government is an impossible notion for a democracy." Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case:A Note on
"The CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment", 1964 S Ct Rev 191, 205. See also Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States 19-20 (Harvard 1941) (citing freedom of expression as a key difference between the Constitution and British rule); Michael T. Gibson, The
Supreme Court and Freedom ofExpression from 1791 to 1917, 55 Fordham L Rev 263, 272
(1986) ("Modem writers find the concept of seditious libel to be flatly incompatible with the
existence of a republican form of government in which the people are sovereign."); Alexander
Meiklejohn, Free Speech And Its Relation to Self-Government 90 (Harper & Brothers 1948)
(calling freedom of speech the "principle upon whose integrity the entire structure of government by consent of the governed rests"). Similarly, in terms of freedom of association,
one analyst said, "Government by the people is based on every person's right.., to organize in groups, to question the decisions of the government, and to campaign openly against
it." James MacGregor Bumrns, et al, Government by the People 89 (Prentice Hall 15th ed
1993). These libertarian principles are now generally viewed as being inherent in the Constitution, especially in the First Amendment with its freedom of speech, press, and assembly clauses. For this reason, the Sedition Act is considered by many to have been patently
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court voiced this opinion in dicta when it declared in New
York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1963), that the Act violated the "central meaning of
the First Amendment." Id at 273. As Justice Black wrote in a separate concurring opinion,
the Sedition Act "by common consent has generally been treated as having been a wholly
unjustifiable and much to be regretted violation of the First Amendment." Id at 296 (Black
concurring).
' In 1840-44, Congress, for example, took the unusual step of repaying the fines that
had been assessed during the Aces enforcement. See Alan J. Farber, Reflections on the Sedition Act of 1798, 62 ABA J 324, 328 (1976), citing 6 Stat 802. For summaries of nineteenth
and early twentieth century free speech doctrine, see George Chase, Criticism ofPublic Officers and Candidatesfor Office, 23 Am L Rev 346 (1889) (comparing various late nineteenth
century libel laws); Gibson, 55 Fordham L Rev at 272-92 (cited in note 8); Norman L. Rosenberg, The Law ofPoliticalLibel and Freedom ofPress in Nineteenth Century America:An Interpretation,17 Am J Legal Hist 336 (1973).
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What can be said of the Sedition Act can also be said of Federalist hostility to the Democratic-Republican Clubs. These clubs
appeared throughout the nation after the Frenchman Edmond
Genet visited in 1793. The clubs enjoyed only a brief existence,
since public hostility to them was great. On the floor of the
House, for example, only a few congressmen would openly defend
them.' ° That there was any controversy over these clubs at all reveals how inconsistent Federalist beliefs are with the canons of
modern democracy. The clubs, after all, were engaged in activities that are unobjectionable when judged by the standards of
modem democracy, and are actually considered to be necessary to
its proper functioning." These clubs were organizations of likeminded individuals attempting through persuasion to mobilize
public opinion behind various causes and philosophies, including
opposition to government policy. The techniques they used to accomplish their ends shared much in common with modem political parties. Modern scholars view their emergence as a watershed event and discern in their organization and behavior the
embryonic features of modern day political parties."
"0The minority who defended the clubs, of course, was composed of Jeffersonians, not
Federalists. Many of them, it should be noted, were markedly ambivalent about the impact
these clubs had on a republican political system. For more on the clubs, see Stanley Elkins
and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism ch 10, § 1 at 451-61 (Oxford 1993); Eugene Perry
Link, Democratic-RepublicanSocieties, 1790-1800 (Columbia 1942).
" A standard interpretation of twentieth century political science has been that organizations, especially parties, play an essential role in forming and articulating public
opinion and in enunciating alternatives so that the public can choose. See, for example,
Frank Bealey, Democracy in the Contemporary State 37 (Clarendon 1988) ("[Rlepresentative democracy ... almost inevitably implies the formation of political parties. Parties
are needed to inform electorates, articulate programmes, and aggregate voters."); Stephen
K. Bailey, Howard D. Samuel, and Sidney Baldwin, Government in America 541 (Holt
1957) (stating that parties "are among the most significant instruments of democracy[ ]
... [since they] are the great mobilizers of majorities"); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Representation Values and ReapportionmentPractice:The Eschatology of "One-Man, One-Vote", in J.
Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds, Representation:Nomos X 167, 173 (Atherton
1968) (mentioning the "crucial role of parties as opinion-organizers").
1 Clubs prepared slates of candidates, held party meetings, and communicated with
other clubs throughout the nation. A contemporary noted "that they agree on town committees, drafts of resolutions, and the candidates for elections, that they cabal to carry points,
and that they so carry them." Deodatus-No.II, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
' See Bernard Fay, Early Party Machinery in the United States: Pennsylvania in the
Electionof 1796, 60 Pa Mag Hist and Biog 375, 387-88 (1936); William Miller, FirstFruitsof
Republican Organization:PoliticalAspects of the CongressionalElection of 1794, 63 Pa Mag
Hist and Biog 118, 141-43 (1939). Traditionally, extra-legal political organizations had
viewed themselves as temporary. They typically grew out of crises but were expected to disband when the particular problem passed. What was innovative about the clubs is that they
believed that extra-legal political organizations must exist as ongoing, permanent elements
in the representative system. They also believed that the whole citizenry should be involved
with them. For example, the clubs invited all "[tlo associate yourselves in political societies."
Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, Address to the Citizens of the United States, Baltimore
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Ironically, despite the fact that the principles embodied in
this Act, or exemplified in the Federalists' anti-club attitudes, are
universally considered incompatible with the Constitution and
representative democracy today, this was not the case at the
time. As much scholarship has pointed out, seditious libel laws
and hostility to and restrictions on political association had coexisted with representative government in America since the first
settlement.'4 In the late eighteenth century, political parties still
had few open defenders and even the Sedition Act's opponents
were motivated more by their fear of national power than the belief that such an act was inconsistent with democratic governDaily Intelligenser 1 (June 14, 1794).
" For a discussion of colonial seditious libel laws, see Harold L. Nelson, SeditiousLibel in ColonialAmerica, 3 Am J Legal Hist 160 (1959). For the English background, see
Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the
Press, 37 Stan L Rev 661 (1985). See also W.R.Vance, Freedom of Speech and of the Press,
2 Minn L Rev 239, 242-48 (1918) (discussing English and colonial practices). As Edward S.
Corwin, among others, stated seventy years ago, the Federalist Framers accepted this
tradition and did not think they were rescinding the common law of seditious libel when
they passed the First Amendment. Edward S. Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press under
the FirstAmendment: A Resume, in Douglas B. Maggs, et al, eds, 2 Selected Essays on
ConstitutionalLaw: Limitations on Governmental Power 1060 (Foundation 1938); Carroll,
18 Mich L Rev at 633-34 (cited in note 7). It is important to note that the interpretation
associated with Leonard Levy-that the First Amendment was not originally understood
as invalidating seditious libel-had a long history before the publication of his controversial Legacy of Suppression in 1964 (cited in note 3). The interpretation had simply been
less popular for the previous forty or so years. Even Zechariah Chafee, Jr., although primarily responsible for creating the dominant twentieth century interpretation that the
First Amendment proscribed prosecutions for seditious libel, appears later to have come to
conclusions not that different from Levy's. Strangely, no one seems aware of this, and
Chafee is identified only with his earlier opinions. See, for example, Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Book Review, 62 Harv L Rev 891, 898 (1949), reviewing Alexander Meiklejohn, Free
Speech: And its Relation to Self-Government (Harper 1948); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The
Great Liberty: Freedom of Speech and Press, in Alfred H. Kelly, ed, Foundationsof Freedom in the American Constitution52, 86-87 (Harper 1954).
John Marshall was typical not only of his political affiliation but also of his era when
he said, referring to seditious libel, that "this liability to punishment for slanderous and
malicious publications, has never been considered as detracting from the liberty of the
press." John Marshall, Upholding the Alien and SeditionActs (1798), in John P. Roche, ed,
John Marshall: Major Opinions and Other Writings 32, 46-47 (Bobbs-Merrill 1967). See
also Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal,
1970 Sup Ct Rev 109, 132 (noting that the Framers believed that the First Amendment
prohibited only prior restraints); Carroll, 18 Mich L Rev at 649 (suggesting that Republican opposition to the Sedition Act was based on states' rights rather than freedom of expression); Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press at 1063. See generally Leonard W. Levy,
Emergence of a FreePress (Oxford 1985) (revising the author's previous indictment of the
Framers as not believing in true freedom of expression in Legacy of Suppression, but
maintaining that the Framers believed in a narrower scope of freedom than the modern
view); Kurland, 55 Miss L J at 232-36, 243-48, 253 (cited in note 3) (arguing that eighteenth century Englishmen and Americans generally saw no conflict between freedom of
the press and proscriptions on seditious libel); James Morton Smith, Freedom's Fetters:
The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties 127-28 (Cornell 1956) (same).
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ment. 5 Perhaps most amazing about this tradition, of which the
Federalists were the last standard-bearers, is how tenaciously its
defenders argued that protecting the reputation of rulers and repressing political associations were necessary to representative
government. Although the literature of that era is full of such defenses, scholars have not taken them seriously, viewing such
claims as too bizarre, incoherent, and "paradoxical" to be anything more than unprincipled polemics. The Federalists, for example, in the most obvious contradiction to modern democratic
tenets, argued that opposing and campaigning against governReactions to the first and second clauses of the Act can be considered separately.
Regarding the second, even a majority of the Act's Jeffersonian detractors implicitly conceded the compatibility between the principles of the Act and those of representative government. Only a few of the bill's opponents, after all, justified their stand on the ground
that such an act was incompatible with representative democracy. Indeed, many of those
who opposed the federal statute took no exception to, or even supported, similar actions at
the state level. For example, as a reason for not passing the bill, Representative Macon
noted, with no apparent disapproval, that "persons might be prosecuted for a libel under
the State Governments," and that therefore no national statute was necessary. 11 Annals
of Cong 2106 (July 5, 1798).
Similarly, some of the Act's staunchest enemies, such as Thomas Jefferson, later approved or instigated seditious libel prosecutions in their states. See, for example, Farber,
62 ABA J at 327-28 (cited in note 9) (commenting on Jefferson's support of seditious libel
prosecutions during his administration); Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Mrs. Adams (Sept 11,
1804), in Albert Ellery Bergh, ed, 11 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 49, 51 (Jefferson Memorial Assn 1905) (arguing that state governments have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the press); Leonard W. Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties:The Darker Side 46-48 (Harvard
1963) (same). Jefferson, it appears, not only was unopposed to state prosecutions for seditious libel, but was not even consistently opposed to them on a national level. See, for example, Robert George Wetmore, Seditious Libel Prosecutions in 1806 in the Federal Court in
Connecticut; United States v. Tapping Reeve and Companion Cases, 57 Corn Bar J 196
(1983) (chronicling a seditious libel prosecution during the Jefferson Administration).
The fact that most of the states had both free speech provisions in their constitutions
and seditious libel statutes on their books serves as further confirmation that most
statesmen in the generation of the Founders saw no contradiction in principle between seditious libel laws and the free speech requirements of a representative government. See,
for example, Berns, 1970 S Ct Rev at 121 (cited in note 14) (noting support for state sedition
laws); Farber, 62 ABA J at 327-28 (supporting sedition laws); Leonard W. Levy, Liberty and
the FirstAmendment: 1790-1800, 68 Am Hist Rev 22, 30 (1962) (noting support for state sedition laws). But see Hortensius, An Essay on the Liberty of the Press (1799), in George Hay,
Two Essays on the Liberty of the Press (Da Capo 1970) (supporting state sedition laws but
opposing the Sedition Act).
It should be mentioned, as Levy points out, that arguments that seditious libel laws were
inconsistent with representative government began to appear after the passage of the Sedition Act. Judging from the newspapers, however, these arguments still possessed a secondary, not primary, character. See Levy, Emergence of a Free Press at 282-349 (cited in
note 14).
The first section of the Act was much less controversial. The opinion that parties were
detrimental to representative government remained standard well into the nineteenth
century. See Ronald P. Formisano, The TransformationofPoliticalCulture: Massachusetts
Parties, 1790s-1840s 88-89 (Oxford 1983) ("If anyone publicly defended 'party' or 'party
spirit' as inherent goods before 1815, it was a rare event."). See also discussion in note 7.
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ment measures was undemocratic since the majority had elected
the government to make policy decisions; they therefore argued
that by obstructing the government, one obstructs the majority.
Similarly, abusing those in office, instead of being an expression
of the democratic right of free speech, was anti-democratic, because to insult elected officials was to insult the people who
elected them.

II.

THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION

To understand the Federalist positions on political speech
and association, one must place them within the context of their
broader theory of representation. This Section begins there, examining the core concepts of representation, then moves on
to define "deliberation" and asks what it means to deliberate through
representatives. It constructs an outline of an unfamiliar Federalist system, one that will allow us to make sense of Federalist
rhetoric in the context of an overall system of democratic representation.
Representation can take place in an extraordinarily wide
range of manners and senses, yet theorists generally agree on its
core meaning. Representation denotes making a thing "present
again" or "re-present" in something else in which it is not actually
present.16 Or, as another scholar has put it, "representation" is
the "presence of that which is absent."" And here is the paradoxical duality at the core of representation: two things that are different and distinct must, at the same time, in some sense, be the
same thing.
From this duality emerge the two necessary conceptual characteristics of representation. First, in order for one thing to be
"present again" in something else, the something else must have
a recognizably separate identity and existence from the original it
represents. Secondly, and paradoxically, it must share in the
same identity as the original; otherwise, the original would not be
making it "re-present." If either "separation" or "identity" is not
maintained, the conceptual integrity of the representation, and
See Hanna F. Pitldn, The Concept ofRepresentation144 (California 1967).
Norton, Reflections on Political Identity 15 (Johns Hopkins 1988). For statements similar to Norton's and Pitkin's, see Harold F. Gosnell, Democracy: The Threshold of
Freedom 131 (Ronald 1948), citing John A. Farlie, The Nature of PoliticalRepresentation, 34
Am Pol Sci Rev 236, 236 (1940) ("Etymologically, the literal meaning of represent is to 'present again,' and from this it has come to mean to appear in place of another."); Representation,
in 23 Encyclopedia Britannica108, 109 (11th ed 1911). See also Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. and
Robert G. Scigliano, Representation:The PerennialIssues (Am Pol Sci Assn 1978) (discussing
the philosophical and political theories underpinning various mechanics of representation).
'6

17Anne
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hence its practical utility, is placed in jeopardy. A painting of an
apple demonstrates this point. The painting can only represent
the apple because, on the one hand, the painting, constructed of
oil and canvas, is something very different from the fructose and
fiber that the apple is made of; yet on the other hand, due to color
and form, the painting resembles the apple. If the painting or the
subject were made of the same materials, or shared no resemblance, however, it would not be clear if representation was taking place, and the painting could not serve practically as a picture

of an apple.
Because the paradoxical identity and separateness between
two objects establishes the underlying dynamics essential to representation, it is there that one must look for the advantages political representation offers as well as the structure it imposes.
The advantage of representation is that it permits a process to be
performed by different people in different contexts and to be
counted as the same. Because the people as a whole cannot meet
and pass laws, modern democracy uses the fiction of representation to permit representatives in the legislature to pass laws that
are considered to be passed by the people themselves.
Enjoying the advantages of representation, however, depends
on maintaining its structure, and for this reason it is essential to
ask just what the twin concepts of identity and separateness
mean in terms of political institutions and norms. 8 The specific
constitutional provisions allowing legislators to pass laws create
"separateness" by denying the people the right to do the same directly. This is repression because the people are explicitly barred
from what is the most democratic of activities. Whatever benefits
representation offers, however, are only available if this "repression" is maintained. 9 Likewise, in the modern context, other institutions and norms, such as elections and laws protecting freedom of speech and association, create "identity" between the peo18I

am here speaking of representation as agency, since although representation exists

in many senses in representative government, its manifestation as agency is the dominant
one. Due to the depth and range of the concept, there are no political systems that are not
"representative" in some sense. Even a hereditary tribal chief, after all, "represents" his people in at least the symbolic sense, since the power and majesty of his office embody their
power and majesty. The presence of elections means that the leaders are the appointed
agents of the people. For a general discussion of the different types of representation, see
Pitkin, The Concept ofRepresentation(cited in note 16); A. Phillips Griffiths, How Can One
Person Represent Another?, in The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XXX7V 187
(Harrison 1960).
"'Those instinctively suspicious of the possibility of conducting democratic deliberations through representative mechanisms should ponder how an ancient Athenian might
respond to modem representative government. Would he call a nation in which only a few
hundred citizens out of many millions are permitted to vote on legislation a democracy?
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ple and the actions of their representatives by encouraging an active political life. This identity gives the laws their legitimacy;20 if
it is lost, so is the validity of the system.
The point of discussing the core principles of representation,
of course, is to demonstrate that democracy and repression are
the same thing in representative government, and to clarify the
underlying dynamics so that they can be applied to the unfamiliar area of "deliberation." As it is used here, deliberation refers
both to the interactive process through which the whole people
form their judgments in a democracy and to the forum in which
this process takes place. More specifically, it will be used to refer
only to this "discussion of the whole" and in no way exhausts all
the types of political communication and deliberation that occur
in a democracy.2
To understand how representatives can deliberate for "the
people," it is necessary to understand two elements of deliberation. First, it is the process through which different parties interact and decide together. Second, through this process, inchoate
elements, such as feelings and facts, are formed into considered
judgments and decisions. To say that the representatives deliberate for the people is to say that they do and must perform both of
these functions. That is, they must receive the unformed elements-undeveloped local sentiments and information about
conditions-in order to validly form them into the considered
judgment of the whole community.
"For at least the last century and a half, the dominant normative justification of
democratic government has been that it implements the actions the people want, the "will"
of the people being "re-present" in the policies of the government. While this idea retains
powerful normative vibrancy, whether or not this really happens empirically has been a
much debated question. As a recent scholar explained, "Teidea of representation is based
on... the concordance between... the will of the represented and the policy of the representatives. In the classical concept [of representation] there should be a rather metaphysical identity between the will of the nation.., and the action of representatives." Marek
Sobolewski, Electors and Representatives:A Contributionto the Theory of Representation,
in Pennock and Chapman, eds, Representation: Nomos X 95, 105 (cited in note 11). See
also Wilder W. Crane, Jr., Do RepresentativesRepresent?, 22 J Politics 295 (1960).
1 The processes outlined here under the term "deliberative process" are basic to virtually all definitions of democracy. In fact, in the past ten to fifteen years, at least in the
minds of many theorists, deliberation has been transformed from merely an essential element of democracy to its basis. Before the current enthusiasm for "deliberative democracy"
(there is now virtually nothing written in democratic theory that is not about deliberation), the same ideas were expressed, but under different names. For example, many
authors used "discussion" as their organizing concept. See, for example, R. Bassett, The
Essentialsof Democracy, in Constructive Democracy 77, 80 (George Allen & Unwin 1938);
Arthur Bryant, The Foundationsof Democracy, in Constructive Democracy 51, 66 ("Democracy" is "a form of government by discussion."); George E. Marcus and Russell L. Hanson, eds, Reconsideringthe DemocraticPublic (Pa State 1993) (collecting essays that study
empirically what goes on in modern democracies when the public deliberates).
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Given this definition of deliberation, several aspects of the
governmental structure needed to support it become clear. First,
the system must enable the representatives to deliberate for the
people and keep the people from doing it themselves. It must,
however, also possess structures that maintain "identity" between the legislators and the people. These requirements suggest
a vertical system in which political communication flows up from
the individual localities to elected officials, providing them with
the information they need to deliberate for the people.22 Second,
the system must maintain this vertical pattern (separation)
through legal and normative prohibitions on direct "deliberation"
amongst the people. Third, because judgment is formed in deliberation, representatives should possess the right to state the
authoritative opinion of the people, and this right should be supported through patterns of political deference to the elected officials.
Representation provides the advantages of better qualified
deliberators, located in an environment more conducive to quality
discussion. Because the people deliberate through the representative mechanisms of the state, their access to this process can be
more evenly, hence democratically, distributed than through direct participation in "civil society." The Federalist system can
plausibly claim to fall directly into this broad description of a representative democracy, and Federalists did in fact claim all of the
accompanying advantages, especially the one regarding more
democratic access to the process of deliberation. The not insubstantial merit of those claims emerges clearly in the following
more detailed examination of the 'Federalists' own rhetoric.
III. THE FEDERALIST POLEMICS OF THE 1790S

A. Discussing Politics Through the Representative
Organs of the State
Since the core normative claim of the Federalists-that the
government should deliberate for the people-is startling given
modern sensibilities, its parameters need to be established first
' Other scholars have noted that the eighteenth century system possessed vertical characteristics, and that the people of different constituencies related to each other not directly,
but through their representatives. Here representative devices served a useful function by

compartmentalizing the subjects into divisions beneath their representatives. "The representative relationship facilitated communication vertically between subject and representative but not horizontally between subjects of different constituencies.... [Tihe only
normal communication they had with their fellow subjects in the political arena was
through the medium of their delegates." Richard Buel, Jr., Democracy and the American
Revolution:A Frame ofReference, 21 Wm & Mary Q 165, 189 (1964).
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and in some detail. As we shall see, the Federalists raise disturbing normative questions for defenders of modern democracy
regarding the location of public discussion and the moral claims
participants may make. Because at their root their battles with
the radicals stemmed from a conflict between two theories of representation, the Federalist contentions were implicit or explicit at
the precise points these theories conflicted.
To grasp this point, however, a brief outline of the modern
system the Federalists rejected is useful. Although still only an
embryo, the radicals had begun to enunciate its basic principles.'
In the modem system the people themselves discuss and decide
basic political issues, and they do this largely through the plethora of competing political organizations that exist in "civil society."24 Through these organizations, they examine and judge political questions and presume both to tell and force the government to do their bidding. The government, in theory at least,
simply implements the "public opinion" that develops among the
people as they deliberate." What is more, these organizations
claim to speak for large sections or majorities of the people. They
have both the right as well as the motivation to do so. As public
opinion aggregators who make their claim to political power
based on the strength of their popular following, they would destroy their position by stating they had no support.26

For a good collection of their thoughts and pronouncements, see Philip S. Foner, ed,
The Democratic-RepublicanSocieties, 1790-1800: A Documentary Sourcebook of Constitutions, Declarations,Addresses,Resolutions and Toasts (Greenwood 1976) ("A Documentary
Sourcebook").
'The role of private political organizations in the formation and articulation of public
opinion and in the forcing of the government to respond is a conventional assertion in the
political science literature. Earlier in this century this took the form of near worship of
political parties and more recently it has been integrated as an aspect of the "civil society"
literature. See, for example, Bailey, Samuel, and Baldwin, Government in America at 541
(cited in note 11); Bealey, Democracy in the Contemporary State at 37 (cited in note 11);
Dixon, Representation Values and ReapportionmentPracticeat 178-80 (cited in note 11).
' This notion can be expressed in different ways. Older writings often said that governments obeyed the "will of the people." Writers now talk in terms of public control-the ability
of the people to make the government do what they want it to do-or in terms of the congruence of public opinion and government policy. See, for example, Bealey, Democracy in the
Contemporary State at 6 (cited in note 11); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to DemocraticTheory 3
(Chicago 1956) (writing on "control" formulations); Barry Holden, The Nature ofDemocracy 8
(Barnes & Noble 1974); H.B. Mayo, An Introduction to DemocraticTheory 60 (Oxford 1960);
Dorothy Pickles, Democracy 137 (Basic Books 1970) ( llhe essence of democratic government is the accountability... to the electorate."). For "public opinion" formulations, see note
20.
, It follows from this that they speak for and to polity-wide audiences. They therefore
must express their demands in terms of the people's preferences and desires, and similarly
must exaggerate the base of their popular support.
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The Federalists rejected this democratic system. Because it
was the legislature that was supposed to discuss, decide, and
speak for people, when organizations did this they saw only the
individuals involved, not the "people."7 The Federalists saw the
activities of these clubs as well as the modern rhetorical stances
they adopted as outrageous usurpations of the prerogatives of
elected officials. Additionally, since they believed themselves defending the only conceptually defensible theory of representation,
the Federalists charged the radicals with what appeared, quite
accurately from their position, to be a variety of intellectual absurdities. It needs to be emphasized that in these altercations the
Federalists clearly identified and unambiguously rejected the
central institutional and conceptual features of the modern system.
Perhaps from the modern perspective the most startling and
most obvious example of Federalist theory is its charge that the
club activities and rhetorical claims were illegitimate because the
clubs had no electoral foundation. What makes this criticism so
revealing is that given modern assumptions it is bizarre, making
absolutely no sense. Since from the modern perspective the clubs
are carrying on perfectly ordinary democratic activities, and are
rhetorically claiming no more than popular support, the Federalists' claims seem strange indeed.
One of the most common complaints against the clubs was
that they claimed to speak for the people, but had not been
elected to do so. Though Federalist theory permitted individuals
or small delimited groups to speak for themselves, the Federalists
viewed attempts to speak for the nation as infringing on the role
of elected officials." As one Federalist pointed out, representative
bodies, not the clubs, were the "well-constituted organs of the
People's will."29 Accordingly, only elected officials, "the constituted
organs of the people," could properly express "the general will of
the nation." 9 For this reason, the modern rhetorical stance of the
radicals grated against Federalist ears. The Federalists complained that the Democrats went so far "as to stile themselves the

Today, for example, the right of ten people to hand out leaflets is defended on the
grounds that the "people" have a right to agitate politically. Believing this right delegated,
the Federalists would not view these ten people under the rubric of "the people," and
would consequently see only ten malcontents.
"For the roles of individuals or small groups, see Section uI.D, especially HlI.D.1 and
I.D.2.
Representative Murray, IV Annals of Cong 907 (Nov 25, 1794).
"Samuel Kendal, A Sermon Delivered on the Day ofNational Thanksgiving 29 (Samuel
Hall 1795) ("Thanksgiving Sermon").
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people" and claim that they "were the people.""1 As Congressman
Ames explained: "They have arrogantly pretended sometimes to
be the people, and sometimes the guardians, the champions of the
people. They affect to feel more zeal for a popular Government,
and to enforce more respect for Republican principles, than the
real Representatives are admitted to entertain." 2
Another Federalist complained of these "societies stiling
themselves democratic without emanating from the choice of the
people, or deriving any authority from that only pure fountain of
power."3 3 Yet another Federalist summed up the argument:
"Those chosen by the people to administer their government are
the proper organs to express the general will of the nation; and no
other body.., has a right to assume this authority, or to pretend
to be the people." 4
If the people speak through their elected officials, then it becomes self-contradictory to claim to speak for the people yet publicly disagree with the government. One Federalist complained
that while the clubbists "have impudently stiled themselves
friends of the people, nay, the people themselves, . . . they have
constantly opposed... every act of the people as declared by their
representatives, in their legislature."3 5 Another asked, "Is this
most remarkable for impudence or inconsistency?" 3 6
Claiming to speak for the people in the modern sense, of
course, is inextricably connected to the rhetorical stance of
claiming to decide public questions, telling the government what
to do, and reaching out for further public popular support. The
Federalists objected to these radical postures as well. They complained that the clubs (with no electoral basis) "spoke with the
voice of decision"37 and "assume[d] the right ... exclusively and
definitively to pass sentence upon" government actions.3 8 Equally
offensive was their predilection to "dictateto the regularly constituted authorities of the nation7 9 and to garner public support by
"arraign[ing] before the public the men and measures of the" government. °
Columbian Centinel, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
"Representative Ames, IV Annals of Cong 923 (Nov 26, 1794).
Marcellus-No. I, Gazette of the United States 1 (Nov 20, 1794).
Kendal, Thanksgiving Sermon at 28-30 (cited in note 30).
Manlius-No.I, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 3, 1794).
Deodatus-No.II, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
Hezekiah Packard, Federal Republicanism Displayed in Two Discourses 28 (John
Russell 1799).
Forthe Columbian Centinel, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
Anti-Club, Columbian Centinel 1 (Aug 27, 1794).
For the Columbian Centinel, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794). See also Pack31 Forthe
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The radicals' rhetorical stance, of course, followed from their
desire to shape public opinion and political decisionmaking. The
Federalists objected to this, too. In Congress, for example, clubs
were condemned because, though not elected, they "had arrogated
the management of public opinions and affairs."4 George Washington felt the same way, and in a communication to Congress he
condemned the clubs and their "proceedings, which would arrogate the direction of our affairs, without any degree of authority
derived from the people."42 Federalists complained that "combinations and societies.., not established by public authority" were
influencing the course of the nation.4 3 One Federalist, afraid of
the clubs' influence, reassured himself that the clubs would ultimately fail because the people preferred their nation's course to
be steered by "rulers [who] are chosen," rather than by "jacobin
clubs . . . who wish by their resolves, to guide the affairs of the
empire."' Another journalist, after explaining that in a "representative government" the people "govern" only through their
representatives, complained: "Yet our clubbists pretend to be advocates for the power of the people, when they openly affect to
check, guide and influence public measures in some other way, a
way in which neither the people nor their representatives can
have any agency. "
The Federalists understood, of course, that in order to deliberate and create public opinion, it was necessary to criticize and
examine current events. But since they believed that the process
of deliberation should take place only in the legislature, they
made a great distinction between the latitude of speech given a
representative, who was expressly elected to discuss public affairs, and that given an ordinary person.4 6 So, for example, when
ard, FederalRepublicanism at 27 (cited in note 37) (warning against the influence of parties). Examples of the Federalists condemning the radicals' modern assertive rhetorical
tone are endless. See, for example, Kendal, Thanksgiving Sermon at 28-30 (cited in note

30).
Representative Murray, IVAnnals of Cong 906 (Nov 25, 1794).
President Washington, IV Annals of Cong 796 (Nov 22, 1794).
"Alexander Addison, Necessity of Virtue in the People, 1 Pa 493-94 (Sept 1795), quoted
in Norman L. Rosenberg, Alexander Addison and the Pennsylvania Origins of Federalist
First-AmendmentThought, 108 Pa Mag Hist and Biog 399, 407 (1984).
"Elijah Waterman, An Oration, Delivered Before the Society of Cincinnati, Hartford,
July 4, 1794 18 (1794).
Deodatus-No. I, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
An interesting parallel to their opinion regarding public affairs can be found in their
attitude regarding private reputations. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned that
truth was not a defense
not.., because the law makes no distinction between truth and falsehood, but because the interest of the public requires, that men not invested with public authority
by the laws, shall not usurp the power of public accusation, and arraign before the
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a democratic writer defended the clubs by arguing that they did
and said only things that the Republican minority in the House of
Representatives had done or said, a Federalist replied that this
"furnishes no vindication for the conduct of the clubs . . . [because] [t]here is an obvious distinction . .. between a member
elected by the people to discuss legislative matters and selfcreated and unauthorized clubs."4 v
This view that one must be elected before one may criticize
government-or even discuss public affairs-runs throughout
Federalist commentary on their opponents. One Federalist journalist, for example, attacked the clubs for their audacity in presuming the "right of taking up and deciding upon all questions in
which the people have an interest," and charged that they had
the audacity "to criminate the President and other servants of the
public, as if they had been created to office by the voice of their
Clubs alone."' The journalist suggested that if these club members had been elected "to office," their discussions and judgments
of current affairs and their "criminations" against the president
would have been legitimate. In the same vein, this journalist
criticized the clubs for having "discussed and decided upon the
same questions" as Congress. 49 Another journalist, referring to
the clubs, bluntly asked, "Are they legally elected to enquire into
the conduct of public officers?" ° Yet another, speaking of "the
common good.., or common-weal," said that "no man, or body of
men, except such as be constitutionally appointed for the purpose
by a majority of the whole people, can have a right exclusively to
consult, act upon or direct [it]."'

public, with malicious motives, their neighbors and fellow citizens, exposing them to

partial trials in forms not warranted by the constitution or laws.
Commonwealth v Blanding,20 Mass (3 Pick) 304, 312 (1825). One commentator suggested:
"Under this theory, accusations were to be made solely to the government or other body
that had the authority to deal with them. Thus, the court said complaints about a government officer should be made to the legislature and those against a minister to his
church." Gibson, 55 Fordham L Rev at 287 n 148 (cited in note 8), citing Blanding, 20
Mass at 316-17.
4,From a Correspondent,Gazette of the United States 2 (Dec 2, 1794).
Forthe Columbian Centinel, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
49

Id.

A Friend to Republican Freedom, Gazette of the United States (Apr 10, 1794),
quoted in Richard Buel, Jr., Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 17891815 99 (Cornell 1972).
"1 Order, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 3, 1794). Published complaints concerning the
impropriety of meeting in clubs "to discuss national questions" are legion. See, for example, Anti-Club, Columbian Centinel 1 (Aug 27, 1794).
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This idea that only legislators enjoy full freedom to discuss
public affairs can also be observed in a statement Congressman
Harrison Gray Otis made during the House debates in 1798:
Can there be any necessity of allowing anonymous and irresponsible accusers to drag before the tribunal of public opinion, magistrates, and men in office, upon false and groundless charges? There are sixteen Legislatures in the United
States, in which all the measures of Government are open to
investigation. There are two Houses of Congress, in which
every accusation and suspicion may have free vent, wherein
our jealousies and prejudices may be uttered without re52
straint.
Otis clearly suggests that because the legislatures can investigate
and discuss freely, there is no need for newspapers to do the same
in a nonrepresentative environment. Federalist David Osgood
expressed the same idea in a Thanksgiving Day sermon, where
he asked, "are not the state legislatures fully competent to the
business? Is not their interest at stake and their jealousy always
awake, ready to notice any fault or error in the general government?" 3 Another minister stated it most plainly, denouncing
those "who wontonly undertake to decide upon the constitutionality of laws and treaties, when the constitution itself provides
another tribunal for such trial and decision. " "
52 Representative Otis, VIII Annals of Cong 2150 (July 10, 1798).

David Osgood, The Wonderful Works of GOD are to be remembered, A Sermon Delivered on the day of Annual Thanksgiving, November 20, 1794, in Ellis Sandoz, ed, Political
Sermons of the American FoundingEra: 1730-1805 1219, 1232 (Liberty 1991) ("Thanksgiving Sermon").
' Packard, Federal Republicanism at 28 (cited in note 37). Federalist thinking, it
should be added, was not just a question of attitude, but was reflected in the law. There
were occasional prosecutions for seditious libel on the state as well as the federal level,
based on both statute and common law. Reflecting the view that freedom of speech was
nonetheless essential to the "deliberative process," members of the legislature enjoyed
complete freedom from outside prosecution. Traditionally, the term "free speech" referred
only to what legislators said in chambers. For example, the freedom of speech clauses appearing in colonial charters referred only to the freedom of legislators. Similarly, in Britain
there was no mention of free speech in the Petition of Right (1628) or the Bill of Rights
(1689). As late as 1780, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights referred to the privileged
nature of speech in the legislature without mentioning any popular right of free speech. See
David S. Bogen, The Originsof Freedom of Speech and Press,42 Md L Rev 429, 434 (1983).
The reason for this, of course, was that legislators, not the people, were the ones deliberating. This idea is implicit in the comments John Randolph made to the Virginia House of
Burgesses in 1736. Randolph said of the legislators that "Freedom of Speech is the very Essence of their Being, because, without it, nothing could be thoroly debated, nor could they be
look'd upon as a Council." John Randolph's Speeches to the Virginia House ofBurgesses, Governor and Council, Upon Being Chosen Speaker, August 5 and 6, 1736, in Michael Kammen,
Deputyes and Libertyes: The Origins ofRepresentative Government in ColonialAmerica 195,
198 (Knopf 1969).
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It is in the context of their nonelective nature that the common epithet "self-created" can be understood. One Federalist queried, "Are they chosen by the people? If not, as I know no other
authority, I shall hereafter regard them as self-creators." 5 Another manifestation of this idea was to criticize the clubs for not
having any legal foundation. Deliberation, after all, should occur
through the formally established processes of representation. As
Noah Webster put it, only those "directly authorized by the Constitution and laws" should exert "influence" in a state. 6 The
clubs, however, were "unauthorized by the laws";57 they were "unfounded and unknown to our Constitution and Laws."58 The Federalists wanted to know what right the Democrats had "to organize themselves into self-constituted authorities, unknown to
the constitution."59 They resolved that the nation should "never
suffer an external influence, unknown to the laws of our country,
to interpose and warp its administration."6"
To say that only elected officials should criticize officials and
policy and in other ways guide the affairs of nation is to say that
when others try to do the same, they are usurping an authority
that was actually bestowed on others. Charges to this effect
thickly dot the literature of the 1790s. A columnist writing for the
Gazette of the United States, for example, complained that

through their political agitation and organization the clubs were
"usurping the station assigned to the representatives of their
country constitutionally chosen.""' Another journalist claimed
that the clubs were "invad[ing] the rights or [I seiz[ing] upon the
powers of the constituted authorities of the people." 2
Because it demonstrates that their problem with the clubs
concerned how representation was conceived, it is revealing in
this context that Federalists specifically used the word "delegation." One orator, for example, referring to radical efforts to mobilize support, said to the public, "and you, yes, you, my countrymen, [have] been incited to plunder your constituted authorities
' A Friend to Good Government, New York Daily Gazette (Feb 21, 1794), quoted in
Foner, ed, A DocumentarySourcebook at 154 (cited in note 23).
Noah Webster, Letter to Joseph Priestly, III (Jan 20, 1800), in Harry R. Warfel, ed,
Letters ofNoah Webster 207, 208 (Library 1953).
Osgood, ThanksgivingSermon at 1232 (cited in note 53).
For the Columbian Centinel, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794). See also Osgood,
Thanksgiving Sermon at 1229 (cited in note 53) (denouncing "[plopular societies, unknown
to the laws").
Anti-Club, Columbian Centinel 1 (Aug 27, 1794).
'"Noah Webster, An OrationPronounced before the Citizens of New Haven ...July 4,
1798 14 (T & S Green 1798).
1 Marcellus-No. I, Gazette of the United States 1 (Nov 20, 1794).
Communications, Columbian Centinel 2 (Oct 1, 1794).
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of your choicest delegated powers."63 A congressman asserted that
the clubs were trying "to usurp a power which the people never
delegated to them."64 Justifying the charge of usurpation, Hezekiah Packard, a Federalist minister, explained "that citizens have
a place and a sphere in which to act as well as their rulers," and
there are "constitutional bounds and fences to prevent not only
our rulers from encroaching upon the rights of citizens, but also
to prevent citizens from encroaching upon the delegated rights
and powers of their rulers." 5
The fact that society has delegated certain functions to its
agents implies that when others infringe on these functions, they
are not only usurping the delegated rights of these agents, but
the rights of the delegating principals as well. The people, after
all, have delegated these powers to their officials, and not to the
clubs and opposition press. One Federalist, for example, stated
that by engaging in the kind of political activities they had, the
radicals had "arrogated to themselves rights, which do and can
alone belong to society at large."6 6 Another similarly concluded
that the clubs were "shameless usurpers of the rights of society."67
A third wondered "what presumption then is it, and what an
usurpation of the rights of their brethren, for private associations, unauthorized by the laws, to arrogate this charge to themselves?""
If the Federalists' arguments sound odd, it need only be remembered that to them the "public" nature of public discussion
meant that this discussion was "public" not in the sense of the
village commons, open to all, but of a military base. The people
own it but this does not mean individuals can traverse it at will.
On this point a journalist denied the democratic claim that the
clubs and opposition press enjoyed the right of unfettered free
discussion and agitation because they were part of the "people."
In regards to their "public" discussions of "the measures and
men" involved in national affairs, he pointed out:
As well might a band of midnight Robbers stile themselves
the people, and seize upon the public treasure, under pretense of its being the people's property. The band would apJosiah Quincy, An Oration,PronouncedJuly 4, 1798, at the Request of the Inhabitants
of the Town of Boston, in commemoration of the Anniversary of American Independence 28
(Boston 1798).
Representative Dexter, IV Annals of Cong 938 (Nov 27, 1794).
Packard, FederalRepublicanism at 27-28 (cited in note 37).
Forthe Columbian Centinel,Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
Marcellus-No. I, Gazette of the United States 1 (Nov 20, 1794).
Osgood, Thanksgiving Sermon at 1232 (cited in note 53).
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pear less criminal and dangerous, before any tribunal, than
the Clubs; for the former will have robbed the community
only of its wealth; but the latter destroy also its peace, its
safety and happiness.6 9
Federalist theory also found expression in the charge that
opposition to government was a traitorous attempt to defeat the
will of the people. This assertion followed logically from the fact
that the will of the people, complete and entire, is "re-present" in
the will of the representatives. As one Federalist states, "the Administration, is, of necessity, elected by a majority of the peopletheir proceedings are voluntarily approbated by a majority of the
people, and their measures are authorized by a majority of themselves.... It is patriotism to write in favor of our government-it
is sedition to write against it." 7" Revealing the same set of assumptions, another Federalist said, speaking of the opposition's
vigorous criticism of the "government," that "every violent attack,
therefore, may be concluded to proceed from a conscious opposition to the will of the majority.'"
Because their disagreements with the radicals were conceptual, not just political, the Federalists believed they perceived intellectual inconsistencies in the radical position. One of the most
revealing of these is the accusation that by directly participating
in a process in which representatives were also engaged on their
behalf, the clubs were inconsistently both delegating and exercising the same power at the same time. A Federalist minister,
for example, said, "we reprobate the inconsistent idea of power,
delegated to the rulers, remaining, at the same time, in the hands
of the people,"" and a journalist, reiterating this idea, stated that
Forthe Columbian Centinel, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
o Albany Centinel 1 (Oct 12, 1798). See also Representative Dexter, IV Annals of Cong
937-38 (Nov 27, 1794) ("The clubs have waged war not only with the Government which
the people have instituted and the rulers which they have appointed, but they have counteracted all the most essential principles of Republicanism. They, being a small minority,
have attempted to control the majority.").
" Kendal, Thanksgiving Sermon at 19 (cited in note 30). A writer for the New York
Gazette explained that while opposition to a government not founded on the people's will
can be justified in democratic terms, opposition to a "really legitimate government is treason against the People," and cannot be justified. New York Gazette and General Advertiser (Nov 13, 1798), quoted in Smith, Freedom's Fetters at 179 (cited in note 14). This
opinion was seconded by a writer for the Columbian Centinal who said that when people
have a representative government, "it is treason against the majority of the people for a
small number connecting themselves together by the title of Democrats, Jacobins, or any
other term, to attempt to deprive the REPRESENTATIVES of the PEOPLE of the authority legally and voluntarily delegated to them." Mortimer, Columbian Centinel 1 (Oct 18,
1794).
' John Mellen, A Sermon Delivered before his Excellency the Governor,and the Honourable Legislature, of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the Annual Election: May 31,
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"the idea of delegating power, and reserving the right to exercise
it, is too absurd to be for a moment entertained by any but such
as chiefly compose our Jacobin Societies."7
Other absurdities followed from the radical position. Since
they were engaged in what had been thought a governmental
process, the radicals were accused of trying to establish a second
"government," of trying to "legislate," and of trying to occupy
public "office[s]" or to "overrule" officials.7 4
These absurdities suggest overlapping functions, and this
idea is also inherent in the Federalist assertion that the people
must "choose" between rule by the clubs or by the legislature.75
When two entities occupy the same position, by implication, one
of them is unnecessary. Hence, Federalists spoke of the "inutility
and danger of such societies," because the nation already possessed an "immense body of public functionaries, who . . . are
elected... [and serve] adequate[ly] as functionaries to the public
purposes of the country."76 This idea of redundancy is also implicit in the Federalist argument that, while popular political organizations might be necessary under a despotic government,
they were completely unnecessary under the Federalists' representative government. 7
It is impossible to understand the radical nature of the Federalist alternative to modern democracy unless it is fully grasped
that they specifically identified and rejected the chief institutional and conceptual features of modern democracy. Modern
1797 20-21 (Boston 1797) ("ElectionSermon").
Order,Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 3, 1794).
"For an example of "government," see Marcellus-No. I, Gazette of the United States
(Nov 20, 1794). For an example of "legislate," see Tammany Society, To the People of the
United States Approving of the Conduct of the President of the United States, January 19,
1795, in NY J (Jan 21, 1795), republished in Foner, ed, A Documentary Sourcebook 205, 207
(cited in note 23). For an example of "office," see Representative Dexter, IV Annals of Cong
938 (Nov 27, 1794). For an example of"overrule," which of course implies that the clubs presume to hold some legal office, see Anti-Club, Columbian Centinel 1 (Aug 27, 1794). In modem democracy, of course, we say we oppose or disagree with government; "overruling" has
nothing to do with it.
" Deodatus-No.I, Columbian Centinel 4 (Sept 13, 1794).
7' Representative Murray, IV Annals of Cong 906-07 (Nov 25, 1794).
As Representative Dexter said, "Such societies are proper in a country where Government is despotic, but it is improper that such societies should exist in a free country
like the United States." IV Annals of Cong 910 (Nov 25, 1794). Many others voiced identical
sentiments. A minister, speaking of the "American Committees of Safety" that existed
during the revolution, explained that extra-legal organizations were appropriate then because Americans were living under repressive British rule, "but when a free government
of their own choice was established and put into operation..., these associations were no
longer needful or safe." David Tappan, ChristianThankfulness Explained and Enforced 36
(Samuel Hall 1795). See also Daniel Davis, An Oration, Delivered at Portland,July 4, 1796
14-15 (Portland 1796) (expressing the same distinction).
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democratic theory embraces "intermediate" organizations for
their role in enabling the people to aggregate and develop public
opinion directly by standing between and mediating the relations
between citizen and government.78 The Federalists could not disagree more. One Federalist, for example, challenged the clubs,
asking, "Do the people require intermediary guides betwixt them
and the constituted authorities?"79 Another complained that the
clubs "set themselves up as umpires between the people and the
government," which he abhorred since he was against "any intermediate power or body... between the people and their representatives.""0 Similarly, the efforts at public persuasion inherent
in the modem system, because they imposed the new burden on
the people, that of deciding political questions, were perceived not
as a necessary part of a democratic system, but as invasions of
the citizen's privacy. The Federalists perceived the radicals as
"tyranniz[ing] over the politicalopinions of their fellow citizens."81
The purpose of persuading others, of course, is to aggregate electoral strength in blocks and this too was denounced. Pointing to
the power these aggregations would take from their representatives, the Federalists repeatedly emphasized that, politically
speaking, individuals should operate not as organized groups but
only in terms of "their individual capacities." 2
According to one author, there is a general consensus that "democracy presupposes the
backbone of an 'intermediate structure' of independent groups and voluntary associations."
Giovanni Sartori, Democracy, in David L. Sills, ed, InternationalEncyclopedia of the Social
Sciences 119 (Macmillan 1968), citing William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society
(Free 1959). These institutions form a large component of what is now referred to as "civil
society.: " The latter has sometimes been defined as all the political institutions and activities
that fall short of "government."
" A Friendto Good Government, New York Daily Gazette (Feb 21, 1794), in Foner, ed, A
Documentary Sourcebook at 154 (cited in note 23).
' E.F., Gazette of the United States (July 21, 1794). See also A Citizen, New York Daily
Gazette (Aug 4, 1794), quoted in Buel, Securing the Revolution at 99 (cited in note 50).
"' Marcellus-No. I, Gazette of the United States 2 (Nov 20, 1794). The author went on to
say that they were an "effrontery" because they were attempting "to dictate opinions to
the community." Id. Another Federalist, referring to Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality, stated that clubs "impudently obtruded upon the public, their own opinions on" political questions. Forthe Columbian Centinel, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
' Fisher Ames, for example, noted that "[it is obvious, that the combination of some
hundreds or thousands for political ends will produce a great aggregate stock or mass of
power." Fisher Ames, The Dangersof American Liberty (Boston 1805), in Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds, 2 American PoliticalWritings during the FoundingEra, 17601805 1299, 1320 (Liberty 1983). See also Deodatus-No. II, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27,
1794) ("Men should judge for themselves and not pin their faith on the vote of a club, as if a
parcel of men could throw their real private opinions into a common flock and think as the
major vote may direct."); Osgood, Thanksgiving Sermon at 28 (cited in note 53) (arguing that
citizens should participate in the political process as individuals, not as groups); Rosenberg,
108 Pa Mag Ilist and Biog at 407 (cited in note 43) (discussing Alexander Addison's view
that "collective social movements" were bad, whereas the "convergence of individual actions"
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Underlying the Federalist rejection of modern democratic
processes was a corresponding rejection of the conceptual framework that gave these processes meaning. The modern system encourages the idea of a public continuously involved in the political
process through constant direct deliberation.83 Because the Federalists believed that the public had delegated the task of deliberation, however, they concluded that the public should normally
be absent from the daily political process. This is what lies behind
Madison's comment that "[t]he true distinction between [ancient
Greek democracies] and the American government, lies in the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity, from any
share in the latter."4 Reflected in this absence is a rejection of the
modern idea, elaborated upon by many democratic theorists, that
the locus of decisionmaking power resides in "civil society" and
that government is popularly "controlled" in this way. One Federalist commented that while those of his persuasion
wishe[d]... all men, to be subject to the... public will, expressed by the constitutional legislature . . . [a] Democrat

wishes and endeavors to govern the country by small parties
and private clubs .

.

. and, in short, to put in the power of

private cabals and occasional popular meetings to govern the
constitutional government. 5
Believing that the decisionmaking role of elected officials
should be respected, the Federalists criticized the "external control" wielded by clubs. They condemned the radicals for their "atwas good). The Federalists, in short, were against what one historian called "collective social
movements." Rosenberg, 108 Pa Mag Hist and Biog at 407.
See, for example, Eileen Lorenzi McDonagh, Representative Democracy and State
Building in the ProgressiveEra, 86 Am Pol Sci Rev 938 (1992) (describing the modem view
as claiming that "citizens continuously have 'a form of indirect access to public policy making,' exerting pressure both at the point of elections and throughout terms of office").
Federalist 63 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers382, 387 (Mentor 1961). Though affiliated with Jefferson, Madison retained a Federalist's fear of popular
involvement in the political process until the day he died. See Drew R. McCoy, The Last of
the Fathers:James Madison and the RepublicanLegacy 116-17 (Cambridge 1989).
' Distinctions between a Republican and a Democrat of the Present Day, Columbian
Centinel 3 (Sept 13, 1794). Hamilton also explained: "[A]ll combinations and associations
under whatever plausible character with the real design to ^""counteract controul
Ainflueor awe the regular deliberation or action of the constituted authorities are contrary to
the tue pineiples of a representative
... m. nt this fundamental principle & of the
most 4anger-eus fatendency. Alexander Hamilton, Letter to George Washington containing
Hamilton's draft of Washington's FarewellAddress, July 30, 1796, in Morton J. Frisch, ed,
Selected Writings and Speeches of Alexander Hamilton 430, 439 (Am Enterprise Inst 1985)
(drafting notes in original). This idea is also implicit in the Federalist claim that these
clubs constitute "a chain of political systematic associations, whose object is to control the
elections and measures of our rulers." Tappan, ChristianThankfulness at 22-23 n * (cited in
note 77).
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tempt to overawe the government," 6 and their desire "to over-awe
the councils of our country, to rob them of their energy, and deprive them of their power."87 Complaining that the DemocraticRepublicans "wish[ed] to controul the constituted authorities,"8
and that their "professed design is the superintendance of...
government," 9 the Federalists concluded that '[i]n every aspect of
the discussion, the societies formed to control

. . .

a Republican

hateful."90

Government are
After a hostile description of the radical conception of the political process, one Federalist asked facetiously, "[I]s this democracy?"9 The modern answer would, of
course, be yes.
The Federalist ideal was for elected officials to be immune
from the influence of organized factions. One Federalist writer
went so far as to say that government would not be safe "until the
legislative body is set totally above the influence of a surrounding
populace."92
Importantly, because the Federalists believed external control violated the principles of representation, they also believed it
violated the principles of the Constitution. They rejected the radicals' contention that private political organizations could be one
of the "checks and balances" in the Constitution. One Federalist
declared that these "checks and balances . . . are not only un-

known to the Constitution but altogether repugnant to it."93 Noah
Webster, an arch-deacon of Federalism, seconded this notion: "If
that system of creating a popular interest extraneous from the
legislature to influence their proceedings-that system of raising
a multitude of isolated private clubs over the nation as its
guardians-should spread thro the country, we may bid adieu to
our Constitution." 4
B. Duty to Support Representatives and the Government
While the restrictive manifestations of Federalist democratic
theory, such as the Sedition Act, have received extraordinary
Manlius No. V, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 17, 1794).
John Wells, An OrationDelivered on the Fourth of July, 1798 13 (M'Lean and Lang
1798).
Communication,Columbian Centinel 3 (Aug 27, 1794).
To the Vigil, Gazette of the United States 2 (Dec 6, 1794).
Representative Ames, IV Annals of Cong 925 (Nov 26, 1794).
91 Anti-Club, Columbian Centinel 1 (Aug 27, 1794).
Revolution in France,Gazette of the United States 2 (Nov 13, 1794). See also Buel, Securing the Revolution at 99 n 20 (cited in note 50).
Communication,Columbian Centinel 3 (Aug 27, 1794).
Webster, Letter to Theodore Sedgewick (Jan 2, 1795), in Warfel, ed, Letters of Noah
Webster 124, 125 (cited in note 56).
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amounts of attention, their corresponding positive duties have
been largely ignored. But the historical record is clear that the
Federalists expected the people not only to refrain from engaging
in public deliberation, but also to support the results produced by
their elected representatives. This requirement of support for
government actions underlies the Sedition Act.
The theory behind the Federalist position is a straightforward application of "separateness" and "identity" to the process of
deliberation. The Federalists held that the people elected representatives to deliberate on their behalf. Since deliberation involves developing and creating a public will, it would therefore be
self-contradictory for the people to deny support and respect for
the representatives and their decisions. Just as the modern citizenry, by refraining from legislating and by obeying laws, maintains the representative fiction that the laws are theirs, the Federalist citizenry, through respect and support, maintains the representative fiction that the pronouncements and policies of government are theirs. In both cases the agent's actions and principal's behavior correspond.
Federalist literature repeatedly argued that the obligation to
support and respect followed logically from the fact of election. In
response to the opposition press and the clubs, the Federalists
stressed time and time again that Americans must support their
government because they chose it. 5 One Federalist explained
' Even a small review of the literature of the period will reveal innumerable citations to
the effect that the public is obligated to support and respect the officials it elects. See, for example, Address of the Society of Cincinnati of the Commonwealth of Massachusettsto the
President of the United States, Columbian Centinel 1 (July 25, 1798) ("To respect the laws
and support the government of our country, were among the first principles with which we
retired from the field of our revolutionary war."); CelebrationofIndependence, Albany Centinel 1 (July 17, 1798) ("May the reciprocal confidence of the Government in the people, and
the people in their Government never be misplaced."); Embassy of Mr. Monroe, Albany
Centinel 3 (Aug 31, 1798) ("I will therefore add my political creed-that I respect and will, to
my utmost, support the Chief Magistrate of the Union .... That I will ever and cheerfully
obey the Laws of the United States and of every State where I may reside or sojourn; and
will never calumniate any Senator, Representative, Minister, Civil or Military Officer."); Nathanael Emmons, A Discoursedelivered on the NationalFast (Wrentham 1799), in Hyneman
and Lutz, eds, 2 American PoliticalWritings 1023, 1028 (cited in note 82) ("It is the duty of
civil magistrates to seek the general welfare of the people, and so long as they diligently and
faithfully attend upon this very thing, they justly merit the obedience and concurrence of
every one of their subjects. For every person ought to desire, and as far as he can, contribute
to the peace and prosperity of that community to which he belongs. Let a civil constitution be
ever so good, it can answer no valuable purpose, unless the people will submit to those in
administration. Rulers are mere cyphers, without the aid and concurrence of their subjects."); Charles Lee, Defence of the Alien and Sedition Laws 46 (Fenno 1798) ("Let us not listen to the agitators scattered through the country, busy in deceiving, busy in alarming, busy
in exciting the people against their own laws and their own law givers.") ("[Alnd respecting
[the Alien and Sedition Acts] necessity or expediency, that you will confide in the wisdom
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that "at all times it is a duty [to support] the government of your
choice."96 Another assured President Adams in a petition that the
undersigned were "[f]ully impressed with a sense of the importance of confiding in rulers of our own choice."97 In a piece denouncing the "Jacobin clubs," one orator stated, "Our rulers are
chosen from among us.... [S]hall we then hesitate to confide in
their wisdom, and to abide by their counsels[?]"98 Another Federalist told the people, "You feel and know that a just and entire
confidence in the government appointed by yourselves, is as necessary to your liberty as to your peace."9 Worried about the effects of the clubs and opposition press, he added, "distrust the
counsel, and repel the influence, that would divide you from the
government, which you yourselves have formed for your own protection and happiness. "1 "o
To support also implies respect. As one Federalist put it,
"[The people are.., accustomed.., to choose their Representatives, to respect them when chosen, to place confidence in them,
and obey their laws."' °' Another expressed a similar idea when he
said, "Obedience to the laws, and a venerable respect for those
delegated by the people to enact them, is... a first principle with
real Republicans." °2
As one Federalist explained, pointing to the principle of representation involved: "In a country where all authority originates

and patriotism of the national legislature, the supreme councils of our country, to whom by
our free suffrages are committed our political existence and safety."); Stephen Peabody, Sermon before the General Court of New Hampshire at the Annual Election (1797), in Sandoz,

ed, PoliticalSermons 1323, 1333-34 (cited in note 53) ("How important, then, that [free government] should be supported; that every aid should be given to those who are entrusted
with authority, so long as they perform their duty.... An opposition to good government is
inexcusable, as it 'resists an ordinance of God.-); William Tudor (the elder, of Boston), A
GratulatoryAddress, Delivered July 5th, 1790, before the Society of the Cincinnat4 of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts 11 (Benjamin Russell 1790) (admonishing that "with caution elect, but the delegation once committed, let us not with-hold a generous confidence in
our Rulers").
The corollary of exhorting people to support the government is, of course, condemning
those who oppose it. See, for example, Marcus Brutus, Sixth Letter on the Politicsof the Day,
Albany Centinel (June 12, 1798) (denouncing Irish immigrants who had join[ed] the factions
of your country, and disturb[ed] the peace of the people by turbulent and seditious harangues").
Leonidas, Columbian Centinel 2 (July 18, 1798).
9 To the Presidentof the United States, an addressfrom Cambridge, Mass., Columbian
Centinel 2 (June 2, 1798).
Waterman, An Orationat 18 (cited in note 44).
Marcus Brutus, Letters on the Politics of the Day, Addressed to the People, Albany
Centinel 1 (May 25, 1798).
1"'Id.
"'Webster, Letter to Joseph Priestly,III at 208-09 (cited in note 56).
" Communications,Columbian Centinel 2 (Oct 1, 1794).
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from the people, it is rebellion against ourselves ... to bring our
rulers into contempt.... [Instead of contempt,] honor is due to
the framers and administrators of the laws."'0 3 Another Federalist made the same point. He said: "SUBORDINATION, so obnoxious to some of the feelings of the human heart, is here qualified
by a consciousness, that.., a deference for our rulers, is no other
than respect for ourselves."0 4
Yet another said that "the keenest of all insults against the
people is that, which holds up its representatives to dishonor." 5
Abigail Adams reflected these same assumptions when she complained that the Jacobin commentaries, by insulting the government, were also insulting "the Majesty of the Sovereign People." ' 6 A Federalist newspaper argued that by "indiscriminately
defaming the Legislature and Administration... [the opposition
was] openly vilifying that very PEOPLE for whom they profess so
deep a respect."' 7
An interesting implication of this obligation to support and
respect the government was that it applied no matter what the
government's policies were. Just as today a citizen-whether or
not he agrees with a particular law-is called upon to obey it as
the legitimate and exclusive expression of the people's will, the
Federalist citizen was called upon to defend the exclusive right of
elected officials to decide political questions and speak for the nation, regardless of his personal feelings about the government actions in question. Timothy Dwight, President of Yale University,
explained this in a sermon in 1798. He said that among "good
citizens,"
adherence to our government... may be regarded as a thing
of course. They need not be informed, that the existing rulers
must be the directors of our public affairs, and the only directors; that their views and measures will not and cannot
"'James Freeman, A Sermon for December 15, 1796;The Day ofPublic Thanksgiving 16
(William Spotswood 1796).
' Oliver Fiske, An Oration, Pronounced at Worcester, on the Anniversary of American
Independence;July 4, 1797 5 (Isaiah Thomas 1797).
" Quincy, An Orationat 21-22 (cited in note 63).
"Abigail Adams, Letter to Mary Cranch,Philadelphia,April 26, 1798, quoted in Smith,
Freedom'sFetters at 97 (cited in note 14).
' New York Gazette and General Advertiser (Nov 13, 1798), quoted in Smith, Freedom's
Fetters at 179 (cited in note 14). See also Mellen, Election Sermon at 27 (cited in note 72)
("Permit me to observe, that such a kind of confidence, as has been recommended, may, with
peculiar justice, be expected of the subjects of such a government as our own, in which all the
rulers are, either directly or indirectly, appointed by the people: Since, in censuring them we
do, in some measure, cast a reflection on our own, or at least, the public wisdom or integrity."); Norman L. Rosenberg, Protectingthe Best Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of
Libel 72 (UNC 1986).
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always accord with the judgement of individuals, as the
opinions of individuals accord no better with each other....
[Nevertheless,] the government ought, especially in great
measures, to be as secure, as may be, of the harmonious and
cheerful co-operation of the citizens. All success, here, depends on the hearty concurrence of the community. °8
A similar idea was expressed in a 1797 election sermon, where
the minister stated that a citizen,
whatever his sentiments may be on disputed political questions, will, we may expect, quietly yield up private opinion to
that of the public, as expressed by the constituted organs of
the general voice; so far at least, as to submit, without difficulty or opposition, to its established effects.' 9
Another minister seconded this idea. He said:
Let there be therefore ever so great a diversity of opinion in
the Legislature itself, or among the body of the nation, respecting the expediency of [government] measures; when
they are once enacted by a constitutional majority of the
Legislature, receive the signature of the Supreme Executive,
and become the Laws of the land; it is incumbent on the citizens to support them."0
Alexander Hamilton concurred. Speaking of the government,
he said, "Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties dictated by the fundamental maxims of true Liberty.""'
What distinguishes Hamilton's statement from one a modern
commentator might make is the part about "acquiescing." Today,
of course, as two hundred years ago, the people are obligated to
"comply" with the laws because they have delegated to others the
right to pass them. At this earlier time, however, they were additionally obligated to "acquiesce," in the sense of not opposing government policy, regardless of personal opinion because the policymaking process had also been delegated.
The obligation to support one's officials in their deliberative
capacity effectively confounds any distinction between obeying

"Timothy Dwight, The Duty of Americans, at the Present Crisis (1798), in Sandoz, ed,
PoliticalSermons 1367, 1386 (cited in note 53).
'"Mellen, Election Sermon at 27-28 (cited in note 72).
.. Abiel Holmes, A Sermon Preached at Brattle-Street Church, in Boston, and at Cambridge, April 25, 1799, The Day Appointed by the Presidentof the United States for a National Fast 22 (Young & Minns 1799) ("NationalFast").
. Hamilton, Letter to GeorgeWashington at 439 (cited in note 85).
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the laws and obeying the lawmakers. This is because, unlike the
modern citizen, who is only called upon to support the laws, the
Federalist citizen must also support what led up to and lies behind the laws, that is to say, the policies, viewpoints, and utterances of elected officials. Not making any distinction between
satisfying the legally binding requirements of law and acquiescing to the leadership of those in public office, one Federalist defined "[t]he characteristics of a good citizen" as "obedience to the
laws, and submission to the constituted authorities."" For another, the obligation to support leaders blurred the distinction between following Congress's laws and following its advice. He said
the good citizen should not "resist or contravene, but ...

pay im-

plicit obedience to the acts and even the recommendations of
Congress.""' One New England minister, speaking of "Free governments," explained the rationale behind this attitude:
Every people either directly or indirectly promise submission
to their rulers. Those, who choose their civil magistrates, do
voluntarily pledge their obedience ....
By putting power
into the hands of their rulers, they put it out of their own; by
choosing and authorizing them to govern, they practically
declare, that they are willing to be governed; and by declaring their willingness to be governed, they equally declare
their intention and readiness to obey ....

The subjects of

every elective government, therefore, voluntarily and expressly engage to obey those, whom they raise to places of
power and trust."
The author assumes that when people elect officials, they are not
only choosing people to pass and enforce laws for them, but are
selecting men to lead and direct society; consequently, the obligation to accept their leadership is as strong as that to obey any resulting laws.
By inextricably combining the idea of obeying the law with
that of cooperating with the lawmaker, delegation of the deliberative process blurs or erases completely the distinction between legal and illegal opposition to the law. When farmers in western
Pennsylvania, for example, said they were going to use every "legal measure" at their disposal to "obstruct" the collection of the
whisky tax, Alexander Hamilton rejected their claim as "a con"This was part of a toast given at an Independence Day celebration in Albany, New
York. See The Twenty-Third Anniversary ofAmerican Independence, Albany Centinel 3 (July
6, 1798).
'" A Federalist, Forthe Albany Centinel,Albany Centinel 3 (June 29, 1798).
..Emmons, Discourse at 1027 (cited in note 95).
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tradiction in terms.""5 In Hamilton's mind, the farmers were as
obligated to support the intentions of their governors as they
were to support the letter of the law. He thus considered what
would now be viewed as perfectly legal democratic opposition as
ipso facto evidence of sedition.
By the same pattern of thinking, the duty of support is a constitutional one. Because the obligation to support government is
inherent in representation, and because the United States and
individual state constitutions established representative forms of
government, support is constitutionally prescribed. A writer investigating "[t]he principles of our constitutions" and "the spirit of
our government, as a free representative republic," said as much
when he asked: "Is not the essence of our government representation? Does it not result from this ...

[that] our public functionar-

ies.., are entitled to a large and liberal confidence?"" 6
Another author, writing under the name 'Marcus Brutus,"
made a similar point. "[A]ppeal[ing] to the spirit of the constitution [and] the forms it prescribes," and denouncing "the false and
disastrous principle, that the American people, to be free, must
be jealous of their rulers," he stated that we should "engage our
confidence in the government of our choice."" 7 The type of support
expected was illustrated by the legislature of New York, which,
speaking of "the Constitution of the United States," said that
since the "government" is "being administered by men constitutionally chosen and appointed, [it] shall, in all its constitutional
and legal proceedings, receive our decided support.""8
Under this conception, it is clear that opposition to the policies of the government was tantamount to opposing both representative government and the Constitution itself."' One Federalist, for example, condemned the clubs' avowal of the modern
idea of a legitimate opposition and reiterated the Federalist belief
that representative government necessitated support. Speaking
of a "democrat," he said: "Let him not deceive himself by saying
"Alexander Hamilton, Letter to John Jay (Sept 3, 1792), in Harold C. Syrett, et al, eds,
12 The PapersofAlexander Hamilton 316 (Columbia 1967).
Communication, Albany Centinel 3 (June 8, 1798).
"' Marcus Brutus, Second Letter on the Politics of the Day, Addressed to the People, Albany Centinel 1 (May 29, 1798).
... Address of the Legislature of New-York, to the Presidentof the United States, Albany
Centinel 1-2 (Aug 28, 1798).
.. Using the Old Testament's King David as an analogy, Samuel Kendal argues that attacks on the leader of the nation, "in his official capacity," are really "levelled against the
government itself." Kendal, Thanksgiving Sermon at 6 (cited in note 30). See also Tappan,
ChristianThankfulness at 24 (cited in note 77) (specifically identifying attacks on the administration of government with attacks on the Constitution).
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that he is for his country, but opposed to its government, or that
he is for the government, but opposed to its administration, or
2
that being opposed to all, he is still a republican."'
Representative government, in this writer's opinion, meant citizens should
display "manly, and even unbounded confidence in those whom
the people had chosen to act for them," and should "support their
tried and approved servants.""2
This was by no means an isolated opinion. Throughout Federalist literature, the obligation to support the laws and constitution of the country was consistently confounded with the obligation to support the current administration. Most commonly, Federalists charged that democratic criticisms of the administration
were inconsistent with their claim to support the Constitution
and representative government. One Federalist commented that
the "Republican boasts of his regard to the Federal Constitution
and federal government, yet finds fault with every law and every
act of that government. "'
Sedition, being most fundamentally the refusal to cede
elected officials their right to determine the political course of the
nation, is just the enforcement side of the obligation to support.
Charles Lee, by mentioning a legally enforceable obligation to
"assist" and "respect," implicitly defined the term this way in his
Defence of the Alien and Sedition Laws.' Here he asserted that
"the chief magistrate. .. should be respected and assisted by all
the citizens, and to oppose or hinder him in the due course of discharging his duties, is an offence punishable at common law. " '
This same point was made by another Federalist who clarified
the democratic foundations of sedition laws. He sarcastically
noted that "our mock patriots adopt the absurd, and dangerous
idea, that to serve the people, they must be eternally contending
with their government.-This, in countries of despotic sway, may
indicate true patriotism: but in ours, where the constitution is
sanctioned by the voluntary consent of the people, it wears the
genuine features of sedition and treason."' Ironically, then, sedition was something that could only be considered a crime in representative governments.

A Federalist, For the Albany Centinel,Albany Centinel 3 (June 29, 1798).
121Id.

Communications, Columbian Centinel 2 (Oct 15, 1794). See also A Lover of Consistency, Columbian Centinel 2 (Oct 4, 1794) (claiming that the Jacobins were inconsistent
when they defended the Constitution yet attacked the administration).
Lee, Defence of the Alien and Sedition Laws at 20 (cited in note 95).
"Id at 21.
Daniel Davis, An Oration,Deliveredat Portland,July 4, 1796 15 (Portland 1796).
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In the ultimate analysis, the Federalists believed that government would come to an end if the policies and expressions of
government were not respected, just as the modern citizen believes that government will perish if no one obeys the laws. According to some Federalists, those trying to undermine the confidence of the people in their government "must meditate the destruction of all free government."1 26 Responding to the same
threat, Governor Sumner of Massachusetts remarked that "whoever attempts to divide [the people from their government], cannot be viewed in any other light, than as aiming a blow at the
main pillar, on which the whole superstructure rests."127 Justice
Iredell charged a grand jury: 'Take away from a Republic the
confidence of the people, and the whole fabric crumbles into
dust." 8 A minister similarly charged his congregants, "When
such support is refused, there is the end of all free and regular
government."'2 9
This perceived absolute need to maintain agreement between
the people and their "re-presentations" led Federalists to construct an ideal citizen that was almost the opposite of the modern
one. Whereas the modern ideal citizen is contentious and active,
ready to oppose those in authority if he disagrees about the issues, the Federalist citizen obediently supports his administration. 3 ' As one Federalist said: "If you love your country, you will
of course... adhere to the principles of our national government,
and follow like good citizens, the general current of administration."'3 '
In the Federalist view, members of the public should behave
in a manner that a modern person might call docile. Speaking of
citizens, one Federalist said that "they pay an orderly and respectful regard to the laws and regulations of government; and
... will place confidence in their public officers, and submit their
public concerns with cheerfulness and readiness, to the decisions
and determinations of Congress and their own Legislatures."'
'Answer of the House to the Governor'sAddress, Albany Centinel 1 (June 22, 1798).
' The Genuine Spiritof'76, Unadulterated,UnFrenchified: Governor Sumner'sSpeech to
the Legislatureof Massachusetts,Albany Centinel 3 (June 19, 1798).
' James Iredell, A Charge,Delivered to the Grand Jury for the DistrictofPennsylvania,
in the Circuit Court of the United Statesfor the said District,held in the city of Philadelphia,
April 11, 1799, in Griffith J. McRee, 2 The Life and Correspondenceof James Iredell 565 (D.
Appleton 1858).
Holmes, NationalFast at 22 (cited in note 110).
"The modern ideal is that the "citizens" are "active, participant and rational." Peter
B. Natchez, Images of Voting/Visions of Democracy: Voting Behavior and Democratic Theory 68 (Basic Books 1985).
"'Packard, FederalRepublicanism at 18 (cited in note 37).
'"Governor Trumbell, The Good Old Fire (Farewell Address delivered 1783), reprinted
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Interestingly, the Federalists frequently contrasted the behavior of their hypothetical "good" citizen with that of the democratic "clubbist"; it is the democrat who most closely approximates the modern ideal citizen. Making this comparison, one
Federalist said:
An honest Democrat is modest in his conduct; ... he has a
confidence in those delegated by the people to administer the
government; he is...
no preacher of sedition, nor brawling
disturber of the peace of society. But how opposite to this is
the conduct and character of our modern democrats, our
street declaimers....
These are devoted to excite jealousies
and uneasiness among the people.... [T]hey spend their
whole time in traducing the rulers of the people, decrying the
measures of government, and exciting commotions.'
The passivity of the Federalist citizen seems foreign to modern
eyes, while the turbulent contentiousness of the democrat comes
close to the actively involved citizen of the modern civics textbook.'
C. Federalist Claims to Democratic Superiority
The Federalist theory of democracy has more to say for itself
and a greater contemporary relevance than has been realized. The
Federalists were acutely aware of a fundamental problem in democratic theory and pointed to distortions inherent in the modern system of public deliberation. If deliberation is the "conversation of the
whole," how democratic it is depends on how equal access to the
conversation is. A system that is in theory open to all but in practice permits only a few to participate travesties rather than fulfills

in Columbian Centinel 2 (July 25, 1798).
'"Communications,Columbian Centinel 2 (Oct 1, 1794).
"Many other instances, of course, could be cited in which the Federalists criticized their
opponents for doing what today we think citizens are supposed to do, that is, criticizing and
opposing, through legal means of course, measures they do not like. See, for example, Communications,Columbian Centinel 3 (Sept 13, 1794) (criticizing the Jacobins for, among other
things, "harangu[ing] the people at the comers of the streets, and in the market place;...
aspers[ing] the government of the Union, arraign[ing] those that administer it, insult[ing]
the laws, and encouragfing] opposition to them"); Communications, Columbian Centinel 2
(Oct 1, 1794) (criticizing "our modem brawling self-named democratic professors, our Genetine leaders," claiming that "[tiheir first principle and main object is, to oppose the lawsto attack the constituted authorities-toexcite insurrections;and instead of venerating,they
asperse and calumniate those sent by the people, to make and execute the laws"); Hezekiah
Packard, The Pleaof Patriotism:A Sermon preached in Chelmsford, on the day of Thanksgiving, February 19, 1795 18 (William Greenough 1795) ("Such combinations of men in a republican government, and in a season of peace, are I conceive very pernicious. By setting
themselves up as a check upon government, they disturb and agitate the public mind.").
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democratic promise. The Federalists argued that discussing issues
through the medium of the mass media and private political organizations such as parties introduced enormous inequalities of access, inequalities that could be avoided by deliberating through the
representative process. In short, they argued that the modern open
system of politics is in fact less egalitarian than the closed system
of Federalism. Federalist criticism here is revealing because it corresponds to a point that democratic theorists have been making for
most of this century. Federalists pointed out then, as theorists do
today, that in modern democracy it is those who are politically organized and those who possess better access to the means of communication that dominate political discussion and hence political
events.'35 The Federalists focused on this inequality, stressing
how most citizens were unable or unwilling to so participate. The
central question Federalist arguments point to, then, is given the
fact that only small minorities will participate in public discussion, is it better that the minority be a democratically responsible
one, or one composed of those self-selected individuals who are
best situated to participate in an open system? Viewed from this
perspective the Federalist assertion that the legislature was and
the clubs were not the "people" has real substance.
Though the modern tendency is to interpret radical activity
as an early example of the "people's" involvement in politics, the
Federalists correctly pointed out the small numbers actually participating this way. Bemoaning their influence, Congressman
Ames pointed out, "A few hundred persons only are members of
clubs."'36 Since representatives are few in number too, of course,
it was not their numbers per se that were the problem. In this
connection one of the most telling arguments the Federalists
made is that in their system the minority engaged in public deliberation was democratically accountable to the populace at
large. Implicitly comparing the clubs to democratically accountable officials, one Federalist denounced their power, saying "they
are responsible to nobody for the exercise of it, and are to continue in office as long as they shall please."' Washington, in
calling the clubs "self created," emphasized their unaccountability
and compared them to representatives who being "chosen for the
express purpose" of discussing and determining political ques'"Political scientists today are concerned about the gross inequalities that exist in
terms of active participation and influence in a system to which everyone is connected, albeit as "passive consumers." See Quentin Skinner, Empirical Theorists of Democracy and
their Critics, 1 Political Theory 287 (1973).
Representative Ames, IV Annals of Cong 923 (Nov 26, 1794).
'"Representative Dexter, IV Annals of Cong 938 (Nov 27, 1794).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[66:117

tions were responsible for what they said.'38 The issue of their
unaccountability is also implicit in the constant refrain that their
influence is "arbitrary" and "tyrannical."
In asserting that the clubs were undemocratic the Federalists clearly specified the problem in democratic theory, still with
us today, that they raised. A journalist pointed out that direct
deliberations will greatly favor the organized:
It is easy to see . . . that if part only of the citizens are
formed into Clubs, and the others remain unassociated, the
Clubs though a minority would have an over-ruling influence-and that excess of influence would be unfair, and utterly repugnant to the nature of an equal republican government.'3 9
This argument, of course, suggests the possibility that if every
citizen could be "associated" a system of direct deliberations
might be just. Federalists, in fact, often speculated on just this
question. They usually tentatively conceded the point in theory
but raised doubts about both the practical possibility of a system
of universal popular organization as well as about the equality of
participation were such a system possible.
Congressman Ames, for example, took up the first issue. In
asking if the clubs could serve the people "as a substitute" for
their representatives, he pointed to their small number and
asked rhetorically "to avoid this difficulty, shall the whole people
be classified into clubs? Shall every six miles square be formed
into a club sovereignty?" 4 ° Ames dismissed this possibility as ridiculous. A journalist, after similarly dismissing the practical
possibility of universal participation, pointed out that to be just,
not only would all have to be organized, but participation would
have to be equal. He speculated: 'Perhaps if a society of men were
divided into bodies called Clubs, and those so regulated as to act
equally and fairly, [the clubs might be acceptable]." 4 ' He raised
the question of what is to ensure that the clubs would "act
equally and fairly"?
At the time the Federalists were writing, the most obvious
obstacle to direct deliberation was the undeveloped state of communications. In the eighteenth century it was only in the cities,
not the isolated countryside where the vast majority lived, that
'George

Washington, Letter To Burgess Ball (Sept 25, 1794), in W.B. Allen, ed,

George Washington:A Collection 596, 597 (LibertyClassics 1988).
'Deodatus-No. II, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
" Representative Ames, IV Annals of Cong 923 (Nov 26, 1794).
"'Deodatus-No.II, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
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there existed the access to political information and capacity to
organize with others that made public intervention in the deliberative process possible. The Federalists repeatedly stated that a
system of direct popular politics would effectively disenfranchise
the countryside, allowing city dwellers to disproportionately influence political events. In doing this they were only repeating
arguments that had come up in similar contexts earlier in the
century.'
Contrasting the requirements of universal organization and equal participation with the practical realities of eighteenth century politics, the above quoted Federalist tellingly asks,
"Are the country people the better secured in their privileges,
when they find their votes are guided or rendered null and void
by the dark cabals in the cities?"
The Federalist point about the geographical inequalities inherent in direct participation was made by contrasting the exclusive nature of the clubs with the inclusive nature of participation
through the representative system. While public discussion by
clubs included but a scattering of individuals in a few major cities, public discussion by representation included all citizens because the representatives came to the legislature "from the different parts of the Union," and brought with them "the sense of
their Constituents.""' A similar point was made by Representative Murray. In a debate that repeatedly emphasized how few
people were members of clubs, how geographically concentrated
they were, and consequently how disconnected they were from
the vast majority of Americans, Murray pointed out the very
large number of representatives there were operating on all levels
of government, how geographically dispersed they were, and how
consequently every area in the country had a fair and equal ability to influence government. He listed a great number of elective
offices and said they "all act in the States, counties, townships,
and hundreds, in separate but relative circles, so as to preclude a
partial attention to any one scene, to the exclusion of another."4 5
Though geography played an important role in Federalist
criticisms, one would be mistaken to think they viewed the problem of unequal participation exclusively in these terms. The
" See, for example, K, Remarks on the Constitution of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania
Packet and Daily Advertiser 4 (Oct 15, 1776); To the Printersof the Pennsylvania Journal,
The Pennsylvania Journal (Mar 12, 1777); To the Printersof the PennsylvaniaJournal,The
Pennsylvania Journal (Mar 26, 1777). Attempts to open the political system to greater public
participation were criticized because only some of the people, those in the towns, could participate.
'Deodatus-No. II, Columbian Centinel 1-2 (Sept 27, 1794).
' Washington, Letter To Burgess Ball at 597 (cited in note 138).
" Representative Murray, IV Annals of Cong 907 (Nov 25, 1794).
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revolution in communications and transportation that would occur over the next fifty years would, after all, drastically reduce
the isolation of the countryside, but it would not eradicate the
deeper problems Federalist criticism pointed to. There are two
features in the modern system of direct popular organization that
the Federalists correctly pointed out are discriminatory. First,
popular organizations are private, and participation in them
therefore cannot be regulated in the same manner as participation in the institutions of state can, and second, popular organization is organization by opinion. Political organizations are open to
those who agree with them, which will of necessity leave many
out of the process. As the Federalists pointed out, both these
characteristics contrast sharply with the traditional forms of
popular participation the Federalists accepted. Whereas a Federalist would no more go to a meeting of one of these societies than
a Democrat today would attend a Republican fundraiser, the customary town meeting had been open to every member of the
town, and this access was legally regulated. One Federalist, complaining that most citizens were "excluded" from these clubs, not
only mentioned their private character, but raised the issue of exclusion based on opinion. He stated, "If the common good be the
object of these societies, then every one, who is interested in the
common good, has a right to consult it with them," 46 but of
course, only those sympathetic to the clubs' agenda attended. Another Federalist raising the same issues, but emphasizing the
question of legal access, claimed that the clubs were not necessary since "[ilf the citizens think proper to meet and consult,
what better club can be desired than a town meeting, where all is
day light, and the law has regulated the proceedings in such a
manner as to secure to every man his fair and equal privilege."'4 7
It is by taking account of these real distortions of access that
the full impact of the Federalist charge that the clubs were destroying democracy should be understood. The clubs were trying
to replace an equitable system of representative deliberation with
one that favored organized minorities like themselves.
In their attacks on the radicals the Federalists narrowed in
on how, as the locus of political discussion moved from the legislature to the political organizations of the public realm, the will of
a tiny minority of active radicals was displacing the will of the
whole people. Revealingly using the word "delegated," Hamilton
said, for example, that the problem with these "associations" is
Order,Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 3, 1794).
"'Deodatus-No.
II, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
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that "they ...put in the stead of the delegated will of the whole
nation the will of a party."' Another Federalist, disagreeing with
the democrat's very modern belief that the clubs "increase the
popular influence upon" government, explained that as the clubs
"augment the power of party over the laws and legislators, they
diminish and obstruct that of the whole people.... The Government becomes their tool, and instead of being the people's it is the
club's."' Reflecting the same assumptions and afraid of the
clubs' influence reaching to the House of Representatives, one
congressman warned that unless stopped, "The power of the clubs
will prevail even here and that of the people will proportionally
decline."5 0
Interestingly, the way Federalists usually condemned the
undemocratic nature of radical influence was by turning the language of the democrats back on them and calling them "aristocrats." In terms of democratic theory, the Federalists clearly had
a point. As one Federalist explained: "The clubs affect to be
popular societies. They are not so. They are aristocratic. For what
is their power and influence but usurped and exercised in derogation and sometimes in total destruction of the equal rights of oth5
ers."' '
Another, referring to the displacement of the people's will by

that of the clubs, added that the clubs were "an aristocratic junto,
who wish to controul the constituted authorities and set up their
will as the supreme law." 52
D.

The Democratic Processes through which
Deliberation Occurs

The Federalist claim that deliberating through representatives is more democratic because the whole people are represented but only some participate in political organizations is, of

'" Hamilton, Letter to George Washington at 439 (cited in note 85).
" Deodatus-No.II, Columbian Centinel 2 (Sept 27, 1794).
' Representative Ames, IV Annals of Cong 925 (Nov 26, 1794).
" 1Deodatus-No. II, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794). See also Osgood, Thanksgiving
Sermon at 26-27 (cited in note 53) (condemning the clubs for having "more than an equal
voice" in the running of government and for being an "aristocracy").
"'Communication, Columbian Centinel 3 (Aug 27, 1794). Federalist use of the term
"aristocratic" was ubiquitous and was always used to denounce the disproportionate role
Federalists alleged the democrats played in the representative process. One paper said, for

example, that the Jacobin club leaders "are not Democrats, but Aristocrats both in principle
and pursuit." Communications, Columbian Centinel 2 (Oct 1, 1794). See also Tammany Society, To the People ofthe United States at 206 (cited in note 74) (writing that clubs "violate[]
this leading principle of republicanism, that rights are to be equally exercised. [They] discover[ ] under the garb of democracy the cloven foot of aristocracy").
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course, incomplete in itself. It is because modern commentators
have not understood the relationship between Federalist attitudes and Federalist institutions that they have dismissed the
former as undemocratic.'53 The Federalist assertion that representatives deliberate for the people can only make sense in the
context of the processes that made these deliberations "representative." Just as election, free speech, and party competition render modern laws democratic despite the fact that the people do
not actually pass them, the Federalists specified the particular
institutional processes that rendered legislative deliberations
democratic. Just as the modern system is simultaneously democratic and repressive, in that it is designed to enable elected officials to implement popular preferences while denying the people
the right to pass their own laws, the Federalist system facilitated
"representative" discussions while denying the people the right
directly to participate in them.
To enable the legislature to conduct "the dialogue of the
whole" for the people, while denying the people the capacity to do
the same, the Federalists postulated two vertical channels of
communication: the utilization of representatives as information
reporters and the use of petitions.
1.

Information gathering and reporting.

The Federalists viewed the representative as a conduit,
channeling information from his constituency to the national
legislature. The fact that representatives played this role is
rarely commented on in the literature but it is essential to understanding how representative systems functioned before the modern era. Since in the modern system the people deliberate directly, there is no corresponding need that representatives report
local information to their colleagues, and consequently gathering
of information is rarely mentioned as an important role of a modern legislator. In the Federalist system, however, representatives
had to provide this service if deliberations were to take place at
all. For this reason, instead of mentioning how government responds to parties and pressure groups, Federalist literature re"It is this elitism as well as the repression that forms the basis of the traditional view
that the Federalists were "quasi" or even "anti-democrats" who adhered to an "undemocratic" or "insufficiently democratic" philosophy and lived in a "pre-democratic era." See
Martin Diamond, Democracy and the Federalist:A Reconsiderationof the Framers'Intent,
53 Am Pol Sci Rev 52, 56 (1959) (discussing traditional interpretations); Russell L. Hanson, "Commons"and "Commonwealth"at the American Founding:DemocraticRepublicanism as the New American Hybrid, in Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock, eds, Conceptual
Change and the Constitution 165 (Kansas 1988).
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peatedly emphasized the role of the representative as comimunicator of local knowledge.' Deliberations could take place in the
legislature because representatives possessed "a knowledge of the
interests and feelings of the people," and could gather this knowledge in one place.'5 5 As Noah Webster, a leading Federalist of the
period, said, "The object of assembling representatives from all
parts of a state is to collect a knowledge of all the interests of the
whole community."5 ' In an address that never mentions the public's organizing to press its demands on government, Federalist
William Beers said legislators in order to "represent ... society
... should have the most complete knowledge of the wants, the
interests, and the character of their constituents" so they might
"introduce [this information] into the ordinary deliberations" of
the state.'57 One finds these same ideas in The Federalist.Here
there is no mention of Congress learning about the state of the
nation through the media, or from organized lobbies or mass political parties. Instead, James Madison spoke of representatives
as "vehicles" transporting information to the Congress. 55 He
stated that local "knowledge... will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire" to Congress.'5 9 Hamilton's
thought reflected the same assumptions. He asked, "If any question is depending in a State legislature respecting one of the
counties, which demands a knowledge of local details, how is it
acquired? No doubt from the information of the members of the
county." He went on to suggest that the same principle applied to
Congress, where knowledge about each state will be gathered
from members from that state. 6 ' This made the legislature, in
'It should be mentioned that the absence of parties and the various other vehicles of
popular participation in politics can be noted in the realities of Federalist politics as well
as in their rhetoric. Politicians were only in contact with the public when they were back
in their constituencies. See, for example, James Sterling Young, The Washington Community 1800-1828 (Columbia 1966) (discussing the isolation of early Washington, D.C.).
'Federalist 35 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers211, 217 (cited in note
84).
1Although Noah Webster made this statement much later, his ideas remained fairly
constant throughout his life and he was considered an arch-Federalist in the 1790s. Noah
Webster, Letter to Daniel Webster (1837), in Warfel, ed, Letters of Noah Webster 478, 495
(cited in note 56).
"5"William P. Beers, An Address to the Legislature and People of the State of Connecticut
6, 14,30 (T&S Green 1791).
'Federalist 56 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 346, 347 (cited in
note 84).
'Federalist 53 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 330, 333 (cited in
note 84).
" Federalist 36 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers217, 218 (cited in note
84). David F. Epstein also mentions that the Founders envisioned representatives as information gatherers, reporting the particular needs and interests of their constituents to other
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the Federalist view, the only real repository of politically relevant
information. Madison, emphasizing a legislature's unique position in terms of political knowledge, referred to "state legislatures
[as the places] where all the local information and interests of the
State are assembled." 6 ' Consistent with this idea, representatives frequently returned to their constituents before important
votes were made to take the "sense" of the people, suggesting that
there was no other way of ascertaining local opinion.6 2
Communicating information, of course, is a two-way process,
and the representatives served as vertical conduits in this sense
too. The representative was considered a prime source of political
information for his constituents and was expected to explain
public actions to them either personally or through such practices
as circular letters.'63
2.

Petitions: The Federalist alternative to political speech.

As was mentioned, there was, of course, another route by
which knowledge about the people was transferred to the government. Petitions originated in the people themselves, not their
representatives; they were an important political practice in the
eighteenth century, even though recourse to them was only occa-

representatives. David F. Epstein, The PoliticalTheory of The Federalist155 (Chicago 1984).
...
Federalist 56 (Madison) at 348 (cited in note 158). See also James Otis, The rights of
the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds, 1 The
Founders'Constitution 390 (Chicago 1987) (describing how representatives were themselves
sometimes the primary source of legislative information in the British system).
1
"This had been the English and colonial practice. See Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of
American Politics 84 (Vintage 1968); Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of
PopularSovereignty in England and America 215-17 (Norton 1988); John Phillip Reid,
The Concept ofRepresentationin the Age of the American Revolution 85-95 (Chicago 1989).
In 1734, for example, Lord N. Somerset said Members of Parliament had often refused to
take some action "until they had consulted their constituents." Philip Arnold Gibbons,
Ideas of PoliticalRepresentationin Parliament,1660-1832 25 (Oxford 1914). This can also
be found in Cato's Letters. 'This is particularly the spirit of our constitution, in which the
whole nation is represented; and our records afford instances, where the House of Commons have declined entering upon a question of importance, till they had gone into the
country, and consulted their principals, the people." John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon,
The Right and Capacity of the People to judge of Government, in Ronald Hamowy, ed, 1
Cato's Letters, or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and Other Important Subjects
266, 271 (Liberty Fund 1995).
'"That personally explaining political events to constituents was a legislator's responsibility is implicit in the comment that the representatives were now "returning home to
their different districts, to give you a narrative of our transactions, together with the motives and principles upon which we proceeded." See A ProposedAddress from the Representatives.., to their Constituents, in The Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser 2
(Dec 27, 1784). For circular letters see Cunningham, ed, CircularLetters of Congressmen
to Their Constituents(cited in note 7).
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sional."' Although they were also drafted by individuals or small
groups, petitions often claimed to speak for whole communities
and originated in grand juries or town- or county-wide public
meetings. Petitions were addressed to a branch of the legislature
or the executive and were commonly transmitted by the people's
local representative.
Petition writing is an excellent example of how the structures of representation shape popular involvement in politics.
Delegating a process, after all, does not mean that the principal is
uninterested or uninvolved with the process in question. It just
means that her involvement is structured and channeled in such
a way that her will is expressed not directly, but through the will
of her agent. In structure, style, and tone, petition writing reflected this pattern of indirect expression.
Petitions were vertical in nature in that they originated in a
specific locality, claimed to speak for only that locality, and were
addressed and sent to those in government. A petition, for example, might be sent from "The Inhabitants of the Borough of Harrisburg" to the legislature of Pennsylvania. Because they were
not communicated to the people as a whole, they were not like
modern "horizontal" attempts to aggregate popular support behind a given position and force the government to comply. Instead, they were intended simply to inform elected officials about
the conditions and sentiments of a local region, allowing the representatives to put this information together with knowledge of
the sentiments and conditions of other localities and deliberate
for the whole.
Consistent with the vertical nature of petitions, Federalists
thought that petitions were best when they dealt with local concerns and grievances rather than national issues. The assumption was that the people of a locality could contribute to the deliberative process regarding local subjects because they could give
elected officials information the officials might not otherwise
have. Also, the practice of speaking authoritatively about local issues in no way infringed on the legislature's right to deliberate
for the whole. Forthright statements on national concerns, however, would infringe on the right of elected officials to decide and
speak for the people.'65
'See Ruth Bogin, Petitioning and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary
America, 45 Wm & Mary Q 391, 392 n 4 (1988) ("In accordance with earlier English practices, petitions were the principal channel of communication from inhabitants to the government.").
" Due to these attitudes, in Britain during this time petitions were primarily private in
nature and few dealt with "state affairs." The concern was petitions should not infinge on
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Additionally, the deferential tone and language that these
documents adopt reflects the fact that the authors viewed the deliberative process as delegated to their representatives. 6 ' Deference is a way of keeping the "represented" and "representative"
from exercising the same powers in what is to some extent a
shared medium. The two entities can be separated more neatly in
other processes. The sergeant-at-arms simply will not allow ordinary citizens to take seats and vote inside the chamber of an assembly. Deliberations, however, take place in the medium of
public communications-a medium that cannot easily be reserved
for a single entity. A deferential attitude provides part of the solution. By making it clear that their opinions are not of the same
value as the representatives', and that they are not giving orders,
the people can communicate with their elected officials without
intruding on the latter's exclusive right to debate and decide issues.

167

The most obvious manifestation of deference was the authors'
use of words such as "honorable" or "esteemed" to address the
representatives, or "humbly" in reference to themselves.'6 8 In addition, petitions were phrased as requests and not as demands.

the prerogatives of Parliament. See Peter Fraser, Public Petitioningand Parliamentbefore
1832, 46 History 195 (1961).
"'This is not to suggest that deferential language does not also reflect social considerations. It is only to point out that it also contains a dimension that can only be understood in terms of democratic theory. See the discussion of the criteria by which the Federalists judged elected representatives in the text accompanying notes 206-12.
" Most of the attitudes here identified as specifically Federalist actually had much wider
currency. Sometimes these ideas were also shared by anti-Federalists or Jeffersonians (although rarely to the same extent), and virtually all of them have colonial precedents. This is
certainly the case regarding deference. See, for example, John B. Kirby, Early American
Politics-The Searchfor Ideology: An HistoriographicalAnalysis and Critique of the Concept
of 'Deference", 32 J Pol 808, 820-22 (1970) (discussing the deferential attitudes of the eighteenth century). See also Richard R. Beeman, Deference, Republicanism, and the Emergence
of Popular Politics in Eighteenth-Century America, 49 Wm & Mary Q 401 (1992); Jay B.
Gilsdorf and Robert R. Gilsdorf, Elites and Electorates:Some Plain Truths for Historiansof
ColonialAmerica, in David D. Hall, John M. Murrin, and Thad W. Tate, eds, Saints and
Revolutionaries:Essays on EarlyAmerican History 207-44 (Norton 1984); J.R. Pole, Political
Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic (California 1966); Stephen B. Presser, The OriginalMisunderstanding:The English, The Americans, and the Dialectic of FederalistConstitutionalJurisprudence,84 Nw U L Rev 106, 109 (1989) (pointing
out that "aristocracy and the need for deference" was more important in the early republic
than is commonly recognized).
"See Pittsfield Petitions, May 29, 1776, in Oscar and Mary Handlin, eds, Popular
Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 88
(Belknap 1966); PittsfieldMemorial, December 26, 1775, in id at 61. One historian speaking
of petitions commented that "Itihe word 'humble' was ubiquitous in both [17th and 18th] centuries," and that "[pletitionary language by its very nature reduced the petitioner to subservience." Richard L. Bushman, King and People in Provincial Massachusetts 47-48 (UNO
1985). Language had become more modest by the 1790s.
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This wording respected the fact that only elected officials were
believed to have the right to make political decisions. Additionally, in order to ensure that they were not misinterpreted as public intrusions into the deliberative process, these documents
commonly included prefaces apologizing for commenting on public issues and reassuring those receiving the communication that
their judgments would be respected and that there was no intent
to dictate to them. For example, a 1798 address to the president
declared: "We come not, however, to dictate or interfere in the affairs of the nation. We are content that the powers of government
are exercised by those with whom they are constitutionally
lodged."' The same language can be observed in an address to
President Adams that declared that "a sense of propriety ...dictate[d]" that in normal circumstance "we should not presume to
obtrude our sentiments on any branch of the constituted authorities of the country." 7 '
The deferential tone of these addresses, and constituent/representative contacts generally, should not deceive the
reader into thinking that these communications were inconsequential. In order to deliberate for the people, elected officials had
to have information about them. Petitions provided this information and therefore had a privileged status."' Traditionally,
greater leeway was granted to what was said in a petition than to
what was put into print; some even argued that anything in a pe" Celebration ofIndependence,Albany Centinel 2 (July 17, 1798).
"'Under the heading Federalism of the East, this petition was addressed, "To the President of the United States," Columbian Centinel 1 (Oct 13, 1798).
The language used in Federalist petitions would amaze anyone who believes that this
group of Americans understood representative government as functioning even remotely as
it operates now. Repeatedly, petition writers assured those in office that they did not wish to
infringe on their decisionmaking authority. See, for example, The Address of the Inhabitants
of the borough of Harrisburg,in the State of Pennsylvania:To the President of the United
States, Albany Centinel 2 (May 25, 1798) (stating that, although the authors were "disinclin[ed] to intrude upon the managers of the public concerns," "there may be a propriety in
the declaration of sentiments which, in more settled times, might at least be thought superfluous"); Address of the Inhabitantsof the Town of Haverhill, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, To the Presidentofthe United States, Columbian Centinel 2 (June 2, 1798) (stating that
"while we disapprove an interference of the people with the administration of our national
government, [due to the crisis with France] we consider it our duty" to declare support for
the government); Noble Address of the Militia Officers ofNew-Jersey: To the Presidentof the
United States, Albany Centinel 1 (May 25, 1798) ("We come not, Sir, to dictate-[policy matters] are questions entrusted to those in whose patriotism we confide, and according to their
decision we shall always be prepared to act.").
"'When legislative sessions had been closed to the public earlier in the century, legislators could report things to their constituents, such as the votes and debates of the assembly, that could not at the time be reported in newspapers. See J.R. Pole, The Gift of
Government v, 98, 104 (Georgia 1983) (describing the gradual opening of assemblies to the
public).
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tition enjoyed complete immunity from libel. 72 Additionally, powerful norms obliged the legislature to read and respond to each
petition. 73
The reverse side of the privileged role of petitions is that
popular expression had to be restricted to that format, and the
petitions themselves had to be used in their proper "vertical" way.
The purpose of petitions was to channel information from localities to elected officials, so that the officials could aggregate, formulate, and articulate public opinion. For this reason, using petitions to communicate with other localities was considered a grave
misuse: their use in this "horizontal" sense involved the people
directly in the deliberative process." Charles Lee, for example,
"'Inthe pre-moderm tradition in which the Federalists operated, more importance was
placed on protecting the rights of petitioners than on protecting the rights of those wishing to
communicate by means of the press. Testimony surrounding the Trial of the Seven Bishops
for Publishing a Libel (1688), provides a good example. See Kurland and Lerner, 5 The
Founders' Constitution at 191 (cited in note 161). A prosecutor compared the Bishops' supposedly libelous petition to similar language in a book. The Bishops' counsel immediately responded, "Don't compare the writing of a book to the making of a petition; for it is the birthright of the subject to petition." Id. Because petitions were more important than other
printed material as a form of political communication, they merited special protection. See
also Larry D. Eldridge, A DistantHeritage:The Growth of Free Speech in Early America 1519 (NYU 1994) (pointing out that in seventeenth century America individuals could complain
about or deride their government and its officials more freely through official channels, such
as petitions or appeals from court judgments, than they could through unofficial channels,
such as the press); Kurland, 55 Miss L J at 255 (cited in note 3), quoting James Burgh, Political Disquisitions:Or,An Enquiry into Public Errors,Defects and Abuses, bk I, ch IX at
247 (1775) ("In a petition to parliament... libellous words are not punishable; because freedom of speech and writing are indispensably necessary to the carrying on of business.");
Norman B. Smith, 'Shall Make No Law Abridging.. .. " An Analysis of the Neglected, but
Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition,54 U Cin L Rev 1153, 1153 (1986) ("The Supreme Coures
recent decision... reflects an inadequate understanding of the history and purpose of [this]
right... and placed inappropriate limitations on [it].").
'"The importance and status of petitions can be measured by the fact that legislative
agendas were in large measure set by petition writers. See Steven A. Higginson, A Short
History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 Yale L J 142,
142-47 (1986). About half of all eighteenth century legislation was in response to petitions.
See Alan Tully, Constituent-RepresentativeRelationships in EarlyAmerica: The Case of PreRevolutionary Pennsylvania, 11 Can J Hist 139, 145 (1976) (citing the percentage of Pennsylvania laws passed in response to petitions from 1717-75). See generally Raymond C. Bailey, Popular Influence upon Public Policy: Petitioning in Eighteenth-Century Virginia
(Greenwood 1979) (examining the role of petitions).
'In England, for example, attempts to organize petition campaigns in which different
localities sent Parliament similar petitions at the same time were considered illegal by
many. These campaigns were objectionable because, by organizing and aggregating public
opinion behind a particular program, they were, in effect, maling the public itself the deliberating forum and forcing the hand of Parliament. See Fraser, 46 History at 202 (cited in
note 165). Also, it was illegal to submit a petition to Parliament or the King with more than
ten signatures, or for petitions to be delivered by more than ten people, to avoid popular
pressure on government and to preserve the delegated nature of political decisionmaking.
See Bushman, King and People at 46-50 (cited in note 168). Additionally, Fraser mentions
that groups meeting to discuss politics but not sending a petition to Parliament were some-
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criticized a petition written by the people of Albermarle County,
Virginia, because, he claimed, despite the fact that it was "formally addressed" to Congress, its real intended audience was "the
people at large." 75 Assuming that the legislature is the only appropriate decisionmaking forum, Lee makes the highly unmodern
assumption that anyone wishing a genuine "repeal or reform of
the law" would want to communicate exclusively with Congress.
Revealing the way the formation of popular opinion appears to
those who do not believe this is what the people should be doing,
he added that such activities could only be the reflection of a malevolent and purposeless desire to "create discontents among the
people at large."7 6
Even more forbidden than misusing petitions was to step
outside them altogether. When condemning the radicals for opposing or obstructing the government, the Federalists commonly
argued that the people had no need to behave like this since they
had perfectly legitimate ways, such as petitioning, to change the
direction of government. George Washington, for example, condemned the clubs for their "permanent" political organization and
their "arrogant presumption" to publicly denounce an act of Congress. 7 7 In the very same letter, however, he added the caveat
that, of course, "no one denies the right of the people to meet occasionally, to petition for, or remonstrate against, any Act of the
Legislature. " 178 What bothered Washington was not public discontent but the manner of its aggregation and expression.
A similar point was made by Reverend John Smalley. He
said that since the representative system itself provided channels
for the expression of popular discontent, there was no excuse for
private political organizations championing popular causes: "It
may next be observed; that in republican governments, there is
the least occasion for illegal associations, or popular tumults, to
obtain a redress of grievances. If there be any maladministration, or any fault in the constitution, a remedy is pro-

times prosecuted. If a meeting's purpose was not the vertical communication implicit in the
petition, it was presumably to horizontally communicate and agitate amongst the people
themselves and this was not acceptable. See Fraser, 46 History at 203.
175
Lee, Defence of the Alien and Sedition Laws at 14-15 (cited in note 95). British Parliamentarians were similarly offended when they received petitions whose real purpose was to
communicate with and agitate the people themselves. See Fraser, 46 History at 207 n 55
(cited in note 165).
' Lee, Defence of the Alien and SeditionLaws at 14 (cited in note 95).
'Washington, Letter To Burgess Ball at 597 (cited in note 138) (emphasis removed).
See also Marshall Smelser, George Washington and the Alien and Sedition Acts, 59 Am
Hist Rev 322, 324 (1954).
. Washington, Letter to Burgess Ball at 597 (cited in note 138).
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vided, without disturbing the public peace."' Like a good Federalist, he believed that while respectfully worded petitions were
acceptable, political parties were not.
The same point was made by Timothy Pickering when he
complained of a petition from the freeholders of Prince Edward
County. In this case, the people used the correct channel-a petition-but Pickering thought their language was too strong and
questioned its propriety. He made the point that the people can
express anything they want, provided they do so with language
that respects the position of elected officials as public opinion
formers and decisionmakers. Although condemning this particular petition, he agreed that the petitioners in principle had "the
liberty ... of examining the proceedings of the President and
Congress," and that this "claim, which while exercised with decency, and without insult to the constituted authorities, and
without a design or tendency to excite discontents and disobedience to the laws of our country, will never be questioned."80 In
other words, if the people respect the proper channels and forms,
they are perfectly free to communicate with and influence government.
3.

The role of elections.

Not only did channels exist that allowed the people to communicate discontent to their representatives, but the people also
had the ability to remove their representatives from office. While
agents must be supported while fulfilling their tasks, principals
may still judge their performance periodically. Elections filled
this role, though their purpose was conceived differently than in
the modern system. The stricture of support and the structured
nature of participation meant that the public was viewed as normally absent from the political arena. Nevertheless, despite their
apparent comparative political insignificance between elections,
power flowed to the people at these moments of judgment; the
people felt free to exercise their power through dismissing their
elected officials.
Both the nominal impotence and ultimate power of the people are inherent in-the Federalist insistence that political muscle
could be flexed only through elections. In the words of Noah Webster, although "the powers of the people [we]re principally re-

" John Smalley, On the Evils of a Weak Government (May 8, 1800), in Sandoz, ed, Political Sermons 1417, 1435 (cited in note 53).
"From Timothy Pickering,to P.Johnson,Esquire,Albany Centinel 2 (Oct 16, 1798).

1999]

FederalistTheory of Representation

stricted to the direct exercise of the rights of suffrage," 8' that
power "returned" to the people on election day.8l 2 This point is
also inherent in the comments found in the Federalist Columbian
Centinel defending the old order against radicals advocating continuous popular political involvement: "[T]he sovereignty of the
people is delegated to those whom they have freely appointed to
administer [the] constitution, and by them alone can be rightfully
exercised, save at the stated periods of election, when the sovereignty is again at the disposal of the whole people."8 '
The contrast between the public's general absence and election day power corresponds to the contrast between the stricture
of support and the freedom to dismiss representatives. In the
Federalist scheme, it is inconsistent to openly oppose an agent
while he is performing the errand the people have asked him to
do. This, however, does not mean that the public must retain confidence in him or wish to renew his tenure.
Since the obligation to support flowed from the act of election, the Federalists were obligated to support their officials as
long as they. held office. As one Federalist explained, there is a
clear dichotomy: "Ignorant, inefficient, and corrupt magistrates
and legislators should be removed from office; but while they remain, they should be treated with respect."' Another Federalist,
criticizing the clubs' opposition to government, stated that "[i]f
men dislike the present Officers of our Government, let them vote
"Webster, Letter to Joseph Priestley,III at 207 (cited in note 56). Historians have also
noted this eighteenth-century attitude. See Buel, 21 Wm & Mary Q at 189 (cited in note 22)
("[IThe constituents' legitimate powers were confined to the election of their particular representatives").
'For example, a miniter said that "in governments like ours.... all delegated power
may be said, by means of frequent elections, to return, after short intervals, to those who
gave it." Mellen, Election Sermon at 21 (cited in note 72). The moments when constitutions
were formed enjoyed an analogous status with election days. At both times the people possessed their full sovereignty because there was no government to delegate it to. For example,
one Federalist wrote, 'The people never act, in their sovereign capacity, but either in framing
or dissolving a Constitution. While the constitution is in force, the people are either subjects
or agents of the constitution." Alexander Addison, Analysis of the Report of the Committee of
the VirginiaAssembly (Philadelphia 1800), in Hyneman and Lutz, eds, 2 American Political
Writings at 1058 (cited in note 82). This pattern of thought can also be found before the Federalists even existed. See, for example, Benjamin Rush, On the Defects of the Confederation,
in Dagobert D. Runes, ed, The Selected Writings of BenjaminRush 26, 28 (Philosophical Library 1947) (writing, in 1777, that the people "possess [their sovereignty) only on the days of
their elections. After this, it is the property of their rulers"). For an English parallel, see H.T.
Dickinson, ed, Politics and Literature in the Eighteenth Century 155 (Dent 1974), quoting
James Burgh, I PoliticalDisquisitions 28-29, 36-38, 51-54 (1774).
'Order, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 3, 1794).
"'Freeman, A Sermon for December 15, 1796 at 16 (cited in note 103). See also A Friend
of Order, Columbian Centinel 1 (Aug 4, 1798) (insisting that "virtuous men," even if they
have "irresistible proof" that an official is misbehaving, "do not openly accuse him").
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for others at the next election." While magistrates hold their office, however, "all honest men will afford them support-exercising only the constitutional mode of changing men."'85 That is to
say, if unhappy with a representative, men are free to elect another through "constitutional modes," but cannot oppose, and
must support, the man they dislike as long as he still holds office.
A deferential political system does not imply powerlessness,
since the people choose to whom they defer.'86 The combination of
an obligation to support with a perfect freedom to defeat at the
polls, although strange to modern eyes, runs throughout Federalist writings. Interestingly, communications exhorting the people to respect and defer to elected officials often at the same time
emphasized the importance of the people's discretionary power of
election. One Federalist, for example, argued that the people
should rely on their legislature's "collected and united wisdom"
rather than oppose government and engage in "popular clamour."8 7 Nevertheless, he also spoke of the important role the

"freedom and frequency of election" played in the political system,
implying the power of the people both to choose good men and to
turn out bad ones. 88
The Federalist combination of deference and removal power
also has clear parallels in our modern system wherever we have
delegated authority to our representatives. For example, because
the power to pass laws is delegated, the principles of agency demand that the people must obey each law as the legitimate expression of their will even if they never supported or no longer
support the legislation. To change the law, citizens must operate
through their representatives, either persuading them to repeal
the law or electing new delegates who will. The Federalist conception of delegated deliberation is identical. In it, citizens are
required to respect the results of the representatives' deliberation
as the legitimate expression of their own will. They may persuade
'Albany Centinel 1 (Oct 12, 1798). That the people have a right to change governments
through election, but not to oppose government, has been noticed by historians. See, for example, Smith, Freedom'sFettersat 420 (cited in note 14).
"The tendency of modern writers to mistake deference for submission has been commented on by a number of scholars. See, for example, Beeman, 49 Wm & Mary Q at 401-30
(cited in note 167); Gilsdorf and Gilsdorf, Elites and Electoratesat 207-44 (cited in note 167);
Kirby, 32 J Pol at 820-22 (cited in note 167); Pole, PoliticalRepresentationin England at 46
(cited in note 167).
'Trumbull, The Good Old Fire (Farewell Address delivered 1783), reprinted in Columbian Centinel 2 (July 25, 1798).
"'Id.See also William Tudor (the elder, of Boston, 1750-1819), A DiscourseDelivered at
the Request of the Massachusetts Charitable Fire Society, June 1, 1798 10-11 (Samuel
Etheridge 1798) (emphasizing the evils of "party spirit" as well as recognizing the importance of the people's electoral check on their leaders).
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their representatives to take a different course of action, or they
may replace their representatives, but open opposition is impermissible, because it implies the resumption of powers they have
delegated.
E.

A Federalist Theory of the First Amendment

However well-developed the Federalists' theory of democracy,
and however strong their opinions about the illegitimacy of clubs
and disrespectful political speech, it would be a mistake to believe
that these beliefs transferred directly into the constitutional
sphere. The Federalists may have believed that behavior that infringed on authority delegated to the government was "unconstitutional" in the sense that it violated the basic norms, expectations, and structures inherent in the political system; however,
this does not mean that they supported specific legal remedies in
such cases. Specifically, Federalist opinion shifted depending on
whether speech or assembly was at issue. Additionally, freedom
of speech as it applies to the press-and virtually all the political
"speech" at issue during the period was printed-deserves separate consideration. Their understanding of press liberty, though
definitely consistent with their theory of representation, accommodates elements more central to modern than Federalist conceptions of democracy and thereby suggests historical transition.
Federalists asserted a belief in a general constitutional protection for the freedom of speech, but they hedged their statements with qualifications meant to protect elected officials in the
proper operation of the authority delegated to them. In practice
this meant that individuals were perfectly free to criticize government-provided they did it in a manner that did not challenge
the right of the legislators to speak for "the people." One Federalist explained:
I am by no means adverse to open, fair, and candid discussions of political questions; but am however, far from wishing to encourage those societies whose * * * professed design
is the superintendance of that government * * * [and] evident tendency, by obtaining an influence, is to lessen the
power of the officers of government, and to lead, or rather
89
drive, the legislature, where ever they please."
Another Federalist, revealing the same attitude, said:

' To the Vigil, Gazette of the United States 2 (Dec 6, 1794).
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A decent manly statement of opinion, and the reasons on
which it is founded, is the right and honor of the patriot and
republican; and will never endanger the peace of society. But
charges of wicked designs, . . . inflammatory publications
and menacing declarations, misrepresentations and calumnies, are of base original and dangerous tendency; and may
prove destructive to 'liberty and order."9
Reminding his readers that slander violated the norm of
support, he added, "Let us place that confidence in those whom
we choose for our rulers, which is necessary to their success in
the administration of government."' 9'
The Federalists' theory of libel is the exact inverse of the
modern one. Modern First Amendment law reasons that the need
for the people to deliberate means that less protection against libel can be offered public officials than can be extended to ordinary citizens. 92 But in the Federalist conception, democratic obligations to respect government officials existed that did not apply
to ordinary individuals. As the Sedition Act attests, most Federalists seemed to agree that these obligations could be legally enforced. Their feelings regarding whether the obligation to refrain
from political organizing could be legally enforced, however, were
more ambiguous.
'Kendal, Thanksgiving Sermon at 2, 29-30 (cited in note 30). Another Federalist precisely defined a seditious statement as one that refuses to recognize public officials as the
legitimate expressors of the public will. See William White, A Sermon on the Duty of Civil
Disobedience, as Required in Scripture, Delivered in Christ Church and St. Peter's, April
25, 1799, Being a Day of GeneralHumiliation,Appointed by the President of the United
States 20-21 (Philadelphia 1799). White elaborated:
Under.. . a [representative] government, to deny the right of expressing private sentiment on the administration of its powers, would be contrary to the liberal spirit
which it breathes. But when this freedom is abused to the rendering of rulers odious
by misrepresentation and falsehoods; When recourse is had to the low artifices of faction, much more to the outrageous violence of sedition and of treason; Or, what is the
root of all these evils, when there is an intemperate opposition, disdaining submission to public measures, however unequivocally supported by legitimate declarations
of the general will [the instigators must be condemned].
Id. White identified the "general will," of course, with the legislature. See also Representative Dexter, IV Annals of Cong 936 (Nov 27, 1794) ("Let men meet for deliberating on
public matters; let them freely express their opinions in conversation or in print, but let
them do this with a decent respect for the will of the majority, and for the Government
and 1rulers
which the people have appointed.").
9
Kendal, Thanksgiving Sermon at 30 (cited in note 30).
"Reasoning that the people's need for unfettered freedom of discussion outweighs
concern for an official's privacy and reputation, the Supreme Court has ruled that "public
men, are, as it were, public property." New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 268 (1963),
citing Beauharnais v Illinois, 343 US 250, 263 n 18 (1952). Because the shift in understanding concerning representation occurred in the early nineteenth century, public men
had less protection than ordinary individuals for the bulk of that century too.
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As with speech, the Federalists believed that individuals
should be free to associate as they wished; but the Federalists required that this association not interfere with the need to agree
with and support the deliberations of elected officials. Thus, while
associations of a nonpolitical nature-or those interested in politics on a more philosophical level-were acceptable, only gatherings associated with the petition process could engage in overtly
political activities. The Federalists did not confound freedom of
assembly with freedom of association, unlike many modern theorists.'93 When club members, for example, attempted to use the
freedom of assembly principle to defend themselves, the Federalists argued that the right of assembly applied to public meetings,
not private political clubs. Comparing the two, one Federalist
said: "It is often said that all men have a right to meet and consult in a peaceable and orderly way. But [are clubs] the orderly
way in4 our country, where better legal and known ways are in
19
use."
Another Federalist addressed not the disruptiveness of the
clubs, but the way in which they of necessity excluded people
from the political process. Asking, "Who are the People?" he answers by saying that they are "The Whole People." Therefore, he
queries, "Does the declaration of rights say, that a part of the
people have a right, even in an orderly and peaceable manner, to
assemble and consult the common good of the whole."' Whereas
traditional "town hall" meetings had been based on local geographical and political entities, and had been open to all members of those entities, the modern organizations were "exclusive"
in that they were organized by and for only those of a particular
political persuasion. Today we assume that these subgroups are
protected in their right of association. This interpretation, however, is not what the Federalists had in mind, nor is it required
by the text of the First Amendment. "The people" is an inclusive
term, yet any political subgrouping is by definition exclusive. No
one can argue that the National Rifle Association, for example, or
any other political organization, can really be called "the people."
Even a major political party cannot really make that claim. A
meeting in which all members of a given locality are welcome,
however, has a better claim, at least to represent "the people" of a
given area.

'This had been the traditional understanding. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Right ofAssembly, in 2 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 275 (MacMillan 1948).
'Deodatus-No. H, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
Order, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 3, 1794).
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Yet while the Federalists clearly opposed political clubs on a
normative level, it does not follow that every Federalist therefore
assumed that they were illegal. In fact, although the clubs were
universally condemned as pernicious, there was a range of opinion concerning their constitutional and legal status.'96 A few Federalists were convinced that the clubs were illegal and unconstitutional: "The democratical... societies ... are evidently nurseries of sedition, and... I believe in their institution are unlawful, as they are formed for the avowed purpose of a general influence and control upon the measures of government."19 7
Most, however, were more ambivalent. Typical was William
Cobbett's response. Despite calling them "an act of rebellion," and
believing that their very existence "impl[ied] a systematic opposition to the lawful rules of the land," he believed that the clubs
were "unpunishable by law."'9 8 Similarly, another admitted "the
strict right to meet in clubs," even though he argued that the
clubs "abuse[d] . . . the right."'99 As Representative Fitzsimons
said, the clubs were "institutions, not strictly unlawful, yet not
less fatal to good order and true liberty. ' 00 Expressing a similar
sentiment, Representative Dexter said that "such societies were
in themselves, wrong," but he was "still not for making laws
against them."2 '
Perhaps the most revealing reflection of Federalist ambivalence was a 1795 declaration from Tammany Hall: 'We claim it
the unquestionable right of citizens, to associate ... but such associations are only excellent as a revolutionary means, when government is to be overturned. An exercise of this right, in a free
and happy country like this, resembles the sport of firebrands; it
is phrenzy."02
The ambiguities of the Federalist position, however, concern
historical transitions, not merely how directly norms translate
into law. Some authors have argued that freedom of the press
played a "structural" role in the Founders' understanding of the
'This is undoubtedly in part because the clubs were a relatively new phenomena, and
the issues were therefore still unsettled.
' Oliver Wolcott, March 26, 1795, in George Gibbs, ed, 1 Memoirs ofthe Administrations
of Washington and JohnAdams 178, 179 (William Van Norden 1846).
" William Cobbett (Peter Porcupine), History of the American Jacobins, Commonly DenominatedDemocrats 20 (Philadelphia 1796).
"Deodatus-No. II, Columbian Centinel 1 (Sept 27, 1794).
"'Representative Fitzsimons, IV Annals of Cong 899 (Nov 24, 1794).
"'Representative Dexter, IV Annals of Cong 910 (Nov 25, 1794).
'Though historically Tammany Hall has been associated with the Democratic Party, its
early members clearly had pro-Federalist sympathies. See Tammany Society, To the People
of the United States at 205 (cited in note 74).
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political process. That is to say, liberty of the press played an essential role in the political system. °3 This would appear inconsistent with Federalist theory. The press by its very nature is "horizontal." It connects members of the public on a cross-constituency
basis, and, by giving them political information, it allows them to
"deliberate." This violates the "vertical" structure of Federalist
communications (representatives and petitions). Though freedom
of discussion is essential in the Federalist system, it is essential
for the representatives; they are deciding, not the people. The
existence of a notion of press liberty, therefore, could be cited as
evidence of an increasingly modern conception of democracy, but
this view is likely mistaken. The Federalists interpreted liberty of
the press in a manner completely consistent with their understanding of the representative process, suggesting they were accommodating new institutions and pre-occupations to an old theory.
The role the Federalists assigned press liberty is quite different from that assigned the media in modem democracy. Modern
defenses of the freedom of the press, for example, are characteristically framed in very broad terms, stating the people's need to
know about and express themselves on the problems and policy
options confronting the nation."4 Eighteenth century rationales,
in contrast, are framed in very narrow terms.0 5 They are concerned almost exclusively with either judging the competence of
those elected to office or with uncovering their betrayal of the
public trust. The shift in emphasis follows from the fact that the
'See, for example, David Anderson, Levy vs. Levy, 84 Mich L Rev 777, 777-86 (1986);
Anderson, 30 UCLA L Rev 455 (cited in note 3). See also Chafee, Free Speech in the United
States (cited in note 8).
'Modern free speech statements typically stress the fact that the people must decide
questions of policy. See for example, Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment
Theory, 1977 Am Bar Found Res J 521, 555 (1977) (paraphrasing Alexander Meiklejohn's
view that "[tihe agents of the electorate have no authority to decide what serves the general
welfare; that determination... can be made only by a continuing process of informed, disinterested reflection and discussion by the citizenry as a whole"); Schauer, Free Speech and the
Argument from Democracy at 243-44 (cited in note 8) (arguing that "[ilf political deliberation
is in fact central in our conception of freedom of speech, then the implication is that political
considerations explain this special solicitude").
"Other scholars have noted that at this time freedom of the press was justified in very
narrow terms that did not reflect the people's involvement in the governing process. See, for
example, Blasi, 1977 Am Bar Found Res J at 542 (cited in note 204) (noting that unlike modem justifications, eighteenth century freedom of the press rationales held that "the role of
the ordinary citizen is not so much to contribute on a continuing basis to the formation of
public policy as to retain a veto power to be employed when the decisions of officials pass certain bounds" that qualify as a breach of the public trust). But see Thomas I. Emerson, The
System of Freedom of Expression 5 (Random House 1970) (claiming that "the basic theory
underlying the legal framework [of the freedom of the press] has remained substantially unchanged since its development in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries").
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people in the Federalist system do not deliberate themselves, but
instead choose others to do so for them. They have less need to be
exposed to all of the available alternatives; the fidelity and ability
of the agent becomes the primary purpose for the freedom.
The literature of the era revealed the emphasis eighteenth
century theory placed on examining the trustworthiness and
competence of the representative. An influential pamphlet stated
that freedom of the press was useful "to see whether [public affairs] be well or ill transacted."" 6 Striking a similar note, the
Continental Congress in its "Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec" repeated the standard rationale of fear of abuse of authority
by stating that freedom of the press is good because with it "oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated into more honourable
and just modes of conducting affairs."0 ' Reiterating the point, a
writer for the Independent Gazetteer spoke of how a free press
could expose the "faults" of elected officials.2 "°
None of these commentators, however, defended freedom of
the press on the basis that the people need to know about and resolve the various problems and options confronting the nation.
The commentators entirely concentrated on the behavior of the
representative. In contrast, although modern justifications for the
freedom of the press include questions of trust and competence,
they are not restricted to these concerns.
It is important to note here that Federalist thought on press
liberty is just an extension of their theory of elections. Since the
Federalist citizenry were selecting an agent to make decisions for
them, elections could not be perceived as facilitating popular
choice between different ideological and programmatic options,
since decisionmaking is precisely what had been delegated. Elections, then, were not about choosing between political alternatives but about selecting others to choose between the alternatives for them. For this reason elections were about finding candidates with the highest abilities and moral integrity. The former
"Trenchard and Gordon, Of Freedom of Speech, in Hamowy, ed, Cato's Letters 110, 111
(cited in note 162).
'Appeal to the Inhabitantsof Quebec (Philadelphia 1774), in Hyneman and Lutz, eds, 1
American PoliticalWritings 231, 234 (cited in note 82).
Candid,Independent Gazetteer, or the Chronicle of Freedom (Dec 14, 1782), in Dwight
L. Teeter, Jr., Decent Animadversions: Notes Toward a History of Free Press Theory, in
Donovan H. Bond and W. Reynolds McLeod, eds, Newsletters to Newspapers:EighteenthCentury Journalism237, 242 (W Va 1977). One might also see Article 35 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 in this regard. See also Samuel Eliot Morison, ed, Sources and Documents illustratingthe American Revolution, 1764-1788, and the formation of the Federal
Constitution 173 (Clarendon 1923). Article 35 has commonly been taken to be a good example of early freedom of the press ideology. It justifies freedom of the press, however, only in
terms of the people's right to find out if elected officials are behaving or misbehaving.
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ensured that they had the capacity to perform their function, and
the latter was necessary to guarantee that they used these superior endowments for the people's benefit.
While the modern tendency is to justify elections in terms of
popular choice, what is striking about discussions of elections by
Federalists is that policy preferences are not mentioned and are,
implicitly or explicitly, rejected as the appropriate basis for electoral choice." 9 Instead, things like character, ability, knowledge,
and trustworthiness are normally held to be the only valid criteria upon which voting decisions should be made. In a work that
never mentions the candidates' policy differences as a legitimate
basis for voter discretion, James Iredell said the people "must
choose able and disinterested men to make [laws]." 210 Again ignoring the policy dimension, the Federalist Columbian Centinel
referred to elected officials as "those who by their exemplary conduct and virtuous habits have obtained the administration of
[government]."2"1' And Hamilton said of the electorate, "[T]heir
votes will fall upon those in whom they have the most confidence."2 2
Liberty of the press, of course, facilitated electoral choice.
The point here is that it was part of a larger theory of agency selection that did not imply direct popular involvement with policy
choice. It was therefore, like the Federalists' thought on freedom
of speech and assembly, consistent with their overall theory. Yet,
it should be said, that even the existence of a theory of press liberty, an institution with "horizontal" implications and one addressed to public, not legislative, deliberation, suggests that the

'See, for example, James Ceaser, PresidentialSelection, in J. Tulis and J. Bessette,
eds, The Presidency in the Constitutional Order 234, 248-49 (LSU 1981) (describing the
Founding Fathers' belief that issue appeals should not play a role in presidential elections); Jay B. Hubbell and Douglas Adair, Robert Munford's The Candidates, 5 Wm &
Mary Q 217, 221, 224, 236 (1948); Charles S. Sydnor, American Revolutionaries in the
Making (formerly published as Gentlemen Freeholders) (Free 1952) (describing the issueless character of elections in colonial Virginia).
2
"'McRee, 2 Life and Correspondence of James Iredell at 505 (cited in note 128). See
also Extracts, Albany Centinel 3 (Sept 21, 1798) ("[In] both Houses of Congress .. . men
[are] selected for their virtue, integrity, and talents.").
211
A Friend to Order, Columbian Centinel 1 (Aug 4, 1798). See also John Adams, Defence of the Constitutionsof Government of the United States, in Kurland and Lerner, eds,
1 The Founders' Constitution400, 400 (cited in note 161).
2
Federalist 35 (Hamilton) at 215 (cited in note 155). See also Hartford Connecticut
Courant (Nov 27, 1786; Feb 5, 1787) (stating that the people should be "choosing men for
their abilities, integrity and patriotism" rather than political patronage), as quoted in
Gordon S. Wood, Representation in the American Revolution 46 (Virginia 1969); Andrew
Eliot, A Sermon Preachedbefore his Excellency 36, 50, 51 (Green & Russel 1765) (stipulating that those elected for public office should possess "a larger proportion of understanding and integrity" than the commonality, and that they should "fear God").
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Federalists were accommodating developments that would eventually destroy the Federalist system.
F.

The Unavailability of Federalist Thought

Though unsettling, the Federalist theory of democracy is pertinent to many of our modern democratic problems. Democratic
theorists distraught with the superficiality and manipulation of
mass political communications, or enthralled (as most are today)
with the possibilities of "deliberative democracy," and republican
lawyers looking for justifications for greater state regulation of
communications have much to interest them here. Instinctively,
however, most modern citizens sense Federalist ideas as being
unacceptable and undemocratic, and it is worth discovering in a
more precise way why we feel this way. Paradoxically, the very
reasons that make Federalist theory unacceptable from modern
perspectives made it both necessary and democratic from the
Federalists' perspective. Delegating the deliberative process introduces a structural elitism that only makes sense in terms of
epistemological assumptions and material circumstances that are
no longer accurate or accepted. By examining the core assumptions that justified Federalist deliberation, this Section demonstrates why their theory of representation, at least how they formulated it, cannot be adopted in the modern world.
Representation, always "elitist" since activities are performed by representatives instead of the people themselves, is
even more so regarding the "thinking" process of democratic politics, that is, deliberation. Since through deliberation (and interaction) disparate, uncoordinated, and inchoate elements are transformed into broader perspectives and considered judgments, the
whole is always greater than the sum of its parts. Because the
end product, the considered judgment of the community, is not in
the people's possession, their relationship to their agents is compromised, lacking the capacity for complete evaluation. This fact
shifts the Federalist conception of the representative in the direction of a fiduciary, still an agent but with elements of a trustee.21 3
This is analogous to the relationship between client and attorney
where the agent is hired precisely because her expertise makes
her in some sense the principal's superior.

"Theorists have pointed out that a representative is at once both a trustee for his
constituents as well as their agent. A trustee, of course, acts in his principal's best interest
but not under his direct control; whereas an agent may be following explicit instructions
with little latitude for independent action. The question is just that of emphasis. See Pitkin, The Concept ofRepresentationat 144 (cited in note 16).
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As the attorney analogy demonstrates, this is not necessarily
an absurd arrangement. It was premised on three core Federalist
assumptions: that the people physically could not deliberate, that
politics was about finding the "right" answers, and that some
people, through education and experience, were more capable of
finding these answers. A brief review of how Federalists put
these elements together is illustrative.
It is essential in understanding the Federalist perspective to
appreciate their contention that different localities possessed only
some of the elements necessary to political deliberation, and that
it was only the representatives who could put them together.
Their comments on this subject have geographical as well as social implications. The people in their constituencies, unaided by
the process of exchange and interaction that occurs in deliberation, and lacking education and broader contacts, were frequently
characterized as having "a local or partial view."214 It was the representatives' job to develop this opinion, and this is what Noah
Webster meant when he said, "The design of representation is to
bring the collective interest into view."215 In other words, the
"collective interest" only appears once elected officials have met
and discussed. It does not precede them and is not present in the
people considered by themselves.21 6 Another said as much in
stating that "the real wants and wishes of the community, [are]
collected ... [and] conveyed to that common center"; by adding
that "the public wisdom ...and virtue [were] collected, also," he
suggested that it was the social elite mediating the information.2 17
Repeatedly in Federalist literature the incomplete nature of
political information as it exists among the people themselves
was pointed to in arguing that the people were in no position to
judge or oppose government. For example, a writer in Maine at-

... Debate in House of Representatives,Aug 15, 1789, in Kurland and Lerner, eds, 1 The
Founders'Constitution at 413 (cited in note 161). See also Pole, PoliticalRepresentation in
England at 487-88 (cited in note 167) (explaining that the English people of the time believed that "[1local people knew the details of local questions; they could not be expected to
grasp the affairs of state," and therefore it was the role of Parliament "to transform all these
local impulses into an opinion as to the national interest").
" Noah Webster, An Examination into the leadingprinciples of the FederalConstitution,
in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, Published
during its Discussion by the People, 1787-1788 25, 40 (DaCapo 1968).
216Other scholars have commented that the purpose of representation was understood
differently in the eighteenth century, and that it was not thought of as expressing the people's will. See, for example, Buel, 21 Wm & Mary Q at 166 (cited in note 22) (commenting
that "Itihough modem representative institutions are popularly regarded as the principal
mechanism through which the people ekpress their will in politics, this does not mean they
were viewed in the same light by the Revolutionary generation almost two centuries ago").
...
Tammany Society, To the People of the United States at 206-07 (cited in note 74).
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tacked a resolution of a Democratic-Republican society criticizing
the actions of Congress by sarcastically asking club members to
state their social and economic background, and insisted they
prove they had the "wisdom [and the] means of information to
censure the doings of Congress."2 18
In a more extended piece Minister Samuel Kendal made the
same points. In explaining why legislatures, not the people, must
form the "national will," and why members of the public must
consequently be deferential, he said:
If part are dissatisfied with certain measures, they ought to
remember that the minds of our rulers are the focus, into
which the rays of political light and information are collected, that they are actuated by a regard to general utility,
and not so much by a view to local interest, and that they
must, from their situation, be better able to judge what
measures will promote the general good, with the least
prejudice to local interest, than those can be, who do not enjoy the same means of information.21 9
He went on to explain that though "individuals, or small associations" may "catch a passing ray of political light" and "hastily
form their sentiments," the fact that they cannot see the big picture means they should not "arrogate to themselves the character
of the most fit and capable judges."2 2 If they are so foolish as to
"indulge such a humour [they will] censure measures, of which
they are very inadequate judges, or which the partiality of local
and interested views, rather than a regard for the general utility,
leads them to censure. 2 2 '
This particular understanding of the political process meant
that elected officials not only possessed the right but the obligation to ignore public opinion on occasion. As Stephen Higginson
explained, "when the expediency of a measure is clear to those
who have the means of forming a right Judgement, and who
alone are the regular constituted Judges of it, there can not be
such a 2deference due to popular Opinion, still less to a Clamour
22

only."

216From the Gazette ofMaine, Columbian Centinel 2 (Sept 6, 1794).
2

Kendal,Thanksgiving Sermon at 28 (cited in note 30).

'9

m Id.
"Id. As Edward Bangs explained, "We are supposed to delegate our most intelligent
men to manage our public affairs; and we ought generally to repose a confidence in them,
as better informed than ourselves." Edward Bangs, An Oration on the Anniversary of
American Independence,Pronouncedat Worcester,July 4, 1800 19-20 (Worcester 1800).
'Stephen Higginson, 13 Aug. 1795, to T. Pickering, in 1 Letters of Stephen Higginson,
1783-1804 789 (Hist Assn 1896), quoted in Formisano, Transformationof PoliticalCulture at

1999]

FederalistTheory ofRepresentation

This notion that the representatives deliberate for the people
translates not into the modem idea that the representatives
should do as the people want, but rather into the idea that the
representatives should do as the people would want if only they
had the same perspective as the representative. In other words,
what the people would want if the ingredients necessary for political decision were present amongst them as they are concentrated amongst the representatives. In dismissing criticism of
government, Timothy Dwight explained "that the officers of government are possessed of better information than private persons
can be; that, if [ordinary people] had the same information, they
would probably coincide with the opinions of their rulers."2 2
The assumption that the people could not deliberate was not
unreasonable during the Federalist era. Communications were
quite primitive, and newspapers, the only form of mass communication, were expensive and largely restricted to the urban areas.2" What is more, this geographic and technological justifica-

405 n 20 (cited in note 15). Another example would be the explanation that the radical
democrats' attempts to politically agitate the people were "dangerous" because "[t]he people collectively, cannot judge for themselves, so accurately as an intelligent legislature,
selected particularly for that purpose." Davis, An Oration at 15 (cited in note 77). Reflections of this belief that the people could not and should not make their own political decisions
can be found in any number of places. It is behind the distrust of popular power so often exhibited in The Federalist.See especially numbers 63 (Madison), 71 (Hamilton), 49 (Madison),
62 (Madison), 68 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers(cited in note 84).
'Dwight, The Duty ofAmericans at 1386 (cited in note 108). This quotation, however, is
uncharacteristic of Federalism in general and is more frequently found in Anti-Federalist
writing because it suggests that all the people lack is information, an idea with egalitarian
implications most Federalists chose to avoid. Many of Dwight's other comments do have the
hierarchical implications traditionally associated with the Federalists.
'The transportation and communication revolution that created the modern world,
though beginning in the late eighteenth century, really came to fruition only during the
first half of the nineteenth century. Newspapers, the only element then existing that
might arguably be a part of a system of modem mass communications, had only begun in
the eighteenth century, and they were still too limited in their impact to really serve the
same function as their modern counterparts. As several scholars said of the colonial and
revolutionary press, "[Tihese weekly papers could not be regarded as instruments of mass
communication. Their circulations were small (usually a thousand copies or so), and they
were relatively expensive." Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Jerry Goldman, The
Challenge of Democracy: Government in America 308 (Houghton Mifflin 1st ed 1987). See
also G.A. Cranfield, The Development of the Provincial Newspaper, 1700 to 1760 168-89
(Calerdon 1962) (commenting on the affluence of those who bought newspapers); L. Roth,
The ColonialPrinter 169-90 (Clarendon 2d ed 1938) (same), cited in Patrick Garry, The
FirstAmendment and Freedom of the Press:A Revised Approach to the Market Place of
Ideas Concept, 72 Marq L Rev 187, 215 n 135 (1989); Formisane, Transformationof Political Culture at 407 n 30 (cited in note 15) (commenting on the minimal impact of the newspapers). See generally Michael Emery and Edwin Emery, The Press and America, an Interpretive History of the Mass Media (Prentice Hall 7th ed 1991); Elizabeth L. Eisenstein,
1 The PrintingPressas an Agent of Change (Cambridge 1979); Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism:A History of Newspapers in the United States Through 250 Years, 1690-
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tion was self-consciously stressed in much literature. "[H]ow are
these millions of students to have access to the means of information?" asked Fisher Ames."2 For as Ames bluntly put it, "the people as a body cannot deliberate."2 26 John Adams said that the people "can never act, consult, or reason together because they cannot
march five hundred miles, nor spare the time, nor find a space to
meet. 2 Given the geographical dispersion of the people and the
comparative absence of mass communications and effective
transportation, the Federalists were well justified in their claim
that, if any democratic deliberation was to take place at all, it
had to occur in the legislature and not among the people themselves. Thus, the Federalist theory was the most democratic one
possible in its historical context.
In the modern context, however, the problem would not be
how to enable the people to deliberate, but rather how to keep
them from doing so. In defense of the Federalist theory, one can
still say that discussion among full-time legislators is of a higher
quality than that occurring via mass communications and political organizations, and that participation through representatives
is more equitably distributed. These are not small points. But the
geographical and technological necessity of delegating deliberation is now absent, and it was already vanishing during the Federalist era.
The other two foundational Federalist assumptions enjoy a
similarly doubtful status today. As the "republican revolution" in
historiography has demonstrated, classical, Aristotelian patterns
1940 (MacMillan 1941); William David Sloan, et al, The Media in America, A History
(Publishing Horizons 2d ed 1993).
Added to this must be the fact that these papers had virtually no penetration into rural areas, where 90 percent of the population lived. A journalist, commenting on why
Pennsylvania's abolition of slavery had had no impact on the few slaveholders in rural areas, said it was probably because they had not heard of the law, since "newspapers ...circulated only in the city." The Pennsylvania Gazette (May 18, 1785).
Mass communications beget mass political organizations, so the absence of the former
explains the dearth of the latter. Consistent with this theory of newspaper effectiveness,
mass political organizations such as political parties did not exist in the United States until at least the 1830s. See Ronald P. Formisano, Deferential-Participant
Politics:The Early
Republic's PoliticalCulture, 1789-1840, 68 Am Pol Sci Rev 473 (1974); William G. Shade,
PoliticalPluralismand PartyDevelopment: The Creationof a Modern Party System: 18151852, in Paul Kleppner, et al, eds, The Evolution of American Electoral Systems 77
(Greenwood 1981).
'Ames, The Dangers of American Liberty at 1317 (cited in note 82).
22'Id.
'John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America, in George A. Peek, Jr., ed, The PoliticalWritings ofJohn Adams 105, 146 (Liberal
Arts Press 1954). See also Noah Webster, An Orationon the Anniversary of the Declaration
of Independence (New Haven 1802), in Hyneman and Lutz, eds, 2 American PoliticalWritings 1220, 1230-32 (cited in note 82).
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of thought, including the belief that the common good was objectively discernable, were still powerful in the Federalist period.228
If the common good is objective, political issues have "best" answers, and the class of people most capable of discerning these
answers are society's "natural aristocrats."' 9 The Federalists,
frankly aristocratic, believed the wealthy and educated were best
prepared to understand political questions.O
If one could accept their assumptions, the Federalist idea of
electing an elite is quite democratic. Just as a poor and uneducated individual is best represented not by himself but by a rich
and educated lawyer, despite their social dissimilarity, if politics
has right answers and aristocrats know more of them, it would
hardly serve the people's interests to elect anyone else. The lawyer pursues the client's interest in the context of something the
client does not know, the law, and the Federalist politician pursues the people's interests in the context of something the people
do not know, politics. While people today accept that there are
"better" answers and experts who know them in technical subjects like engineering, they do not think this applies to politics.
We are either skeptical that there are "political truths," or skeptical of recognizing a class that possesses them. 1 As a result, the
people are forced to decide for themselves. After all, while a principal may delegate to an agent the authority to shepherd her
through an area the agent knows better than she does, the idea of
a principal delegating to an agent the authority to decide for her
what she wants is problematic indeed. For these reasons democracy is generally understood in terms of the aggregation of popular preferences and the formation of popular will. The Federalists

'See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism and is it Worth Reviving?, 102
Harv L Rev 1698 (1989); Horwitz, 29 Wm & Mary L Rev at 67-69 (cited in note 6).
'John Adams and Thomas Jefferson are most noted for their use of this term, although the expression was used by many. Adams speaks of "the rich, the well-born" in his
Defence of the Constitutions at 115 (cited in note 227). See also Thomas Jefferson, To John
Adams, in Merrill D. Peterson, ed, The PortableThomas Jefferson 533, 534 (Viking 1975);
Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 1-95 (Knopf 1992) (discussing
the elitism of colonial culture, which Wood thought slowly diminished until the age of
Jackson).
'The Federalist notion of delegating deliberation, it might be added, really demands
such a "political class" and a conception of the common good. Without them, what will be
the basis of electoral selection? The people cannot vote for candidates on the basis of their
programs-the people are not competent to judge these-and the politicians need a standard, the common good, by which to guide their behavior. They cannot use public opinion.
"'Compare David Estlund, Making Truth Safe for Democracy, in David Copp, Jean
Hampton, and John E. Roemer, eds, The Idea of Democracy 1-100 (Cambridge 1993), with
with David Copp, Could Truth be Hazardousfor Democracy?, in Copp, Hampton, and Roemer, eds, The Idea of Democracy 101-17.
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nevertheless had a point. Some people are more politically informed than others, and relying on the public to make decisions,
when most individuals have neither the time nor the interest in
investigating political issues, markedly lowers the quality of
democratic decisions.
CONCLUSION

The fact that the Federalist system is based on unacceptable
premises, however, does not mean it is irrelevant. The central
lesson of the Federalists-that representation is inseparable from
repression, and that this applies to discussion as well as other
political processes-has many potential applications. As part of
our constitutional inheritance, elements of this theory can be
adopted in places and utilized to modify our predominantly liberal interpretation of First Amendment law. Obviously it justifies
a greater role for the state in regulating the mediums in which
public deliberation takes place. The context and quality of public
debate, as well as how democratically participation is distributed,
are considerations to be taken into account in structuring the forums in which such debate takes place. The party that gave us
the Constitution did not intend for public deliberation to be
highjacked by small minorities of active but unrepresentative
citizens. This can only be good news, considering the fact that
viewing participation as an inviolable personal right has led to
government by special interests ruling over a fairly apathetic and
ill-informed public. 2 None of this, of course, is meant to suggest
that the Sedition Act or the campaign against the clubs were anything more than rear-guard actions. The understanding of representation and the Constitution the Federalists sought to preserve
died for historically irreversible reasons. But history has not
stopped changing. Given the tremendous decline in political participation that has occurred during this century, perhaps some of
these Federalist ideas have become relevant again.

'Modern research suggests that a system such as the Federalists envisioned, where
deliberations are restricted to the representatives themselves, would actually be more
democratic. Some scholars have argued that representatives act in a more "representative"
manner when legislative actions cannot be directly traced to them-in other words, when
they are less accountable-because such a system insulates them from the pressure of special interest groups whose views are not representative. The predominant view of today, that
open processes dre more democratic than closed ones, is thus simply mistaken. See R.
Douglas Arnold, The Logic ofCongressionalActionch 10 (Yale 1990).

